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unknown to their German counterparts. Among them is the power to threaten criminal
indictment, one that allows prosecutors to force American corporations to cooperate, to waive
the attorney-client privilege, and to cut ties to individual employees under investigation, thereby
facilitating the prosecution of those individual defendants. Using differences in criminal
procedure rather than criminal theory to explain the uniquely American doctrine, this Note
concludes by suggesting how the criminal procedure approach can best be used to understand-
and potentially to reform - an American system that critics increasingly decry as broken.
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INTRODUCTION
In post-Enron America, corporations are under attack. Increasing
regulation and oversight, the threat of derivative shareholder suits, and the
prospect of personal liability for corporate directors have created an
atmosphere of constant risk for corporations, one decried by an increasingly
vocal band of corporate leaders, legal scholars,' and practitioners At the core
of that criticism, however, is the area of arguably greatest risk to corporations
in modern America: criminal prosecution. In the United States, corporations-
as entities-can be criminally tried and convicted for crimes committed by
individual directors, managers, and even low-level employees. The risk of
indictment alone is devastating: a criminal indictment promises a swift market
response, the ouster of leadership, millions of dollars in legal fees, and, of
course, the possibility of conviction. Such a conviction would lead not only to
any criminal penalties imposed (usually a heavy fine), but also to what others
have termed "collateral consequences" -devastating financial and reputational
repercussions that can, and do, force companies out of business.' As a result, it
is common wisdom within the business community that a conviction amounts
to a potentially lethal blow for a corporation,4 one from which the corporation
1. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure,
82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311 (2007); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A
Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95 (2004); Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations
on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2oo2-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash
with Donaldson over Turf, the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of
Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443 (2004); Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark,
Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REv. 43 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Gregory L. Diskant, Time To Rethink Corporate Criminal Liability, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 2,
2007, at 2; Richard S. Gruner, Three Painful Lessons: Corporate Experience with Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP 51 (Practising
Law Inst. ed., 2007); Joan McPhee, The Survival Dilemma, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 2008, at 4;
Mark Robeck, Amy Vasquez & Michael E. Clark, Corporate Cooperation in the Face of
Government Investigations, HEALTH LAW, Apr. 2005, at 20.
3. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current
White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CKIM. L. REV. 165, 173 (2004); see also
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 235-38 (1991) (discussing the
social and punitive distinctions between civil and criminal sanctions and noting the special
"stigma" that attaches to criminal reprimand).
4. See, e.g., Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82
IND. L.J. 411, 414 (2007) (detailing the potentially lethal consequences of criminal indictment
for a corporation); see also George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42
AM. CRIm. L. REv. 985, 987 (2005) (describing criminal indictment as "lethal, even for
venerable institutions").
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may not recover even if it is actually innocent -just ask the former employees
of Arthur Andersen.'
Corporate criminal liability has become the subject of piqued criticism not
only here but also in the international business community. From a
comparative perspective, such liability marks the United States as relatively
unique. Few other Western countries impose entity liability, and those that do
impose it comparatively infrequently and under the threat of far less serious
punitive consequences. In countries like France and Germany, for example, the
principle of societas delinquere non potest-"a legal entity cannot be
blameworthy"-long prevented imposition of entity criminal liability at all. 6
More recently, France and several other European nations have cautiously
experimented with corporate criminal liability. 7 Germany has held fast in
refusing to punish criminally corporations for the acts of their individual
directors or employees.8
The question of why the United States -and the United States virtually
alone-imposes such significant corporate criminal liability has been the
subject of limited scholarly attention. Those who have studied the field espouse
varying rationales for America's unique position. Some have argued that the
American system grew out of the common law tradition, one that historically
embraced the legal fiction - prevalent in corporate law - of the business entity
as a separate being.9 Others have focused on the Continental system's use of
5. Arthur Andersen was convicted at trial of obstruction of justice. The company folded shortly
after the conviction. The fact that U. S. Supreme Court would later overturn that conviction
on a technicality related to the jury charge was of little consolation to the thousands of
employees rendered jobless. See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons
of the ArthurAndersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006).
6. See Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About
American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 1O5 (2004).
7. See Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on Post-Enron
Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911 (2003) (noting recent
developments in European countries in the context of corporate criminal liability); Roland
Hefendehl, Corporate Criminal Liability: Model Penal Code Section 2.07 and the Development in
Western Legal Systems, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 283 (2000) (same). For a discussion of
developments in France, see Leonard Orland & Charles Cachera, Corporate Crime and
Punishment in France: Criminal Responsibility of Legal Entities (Personnes Morales) Under the
New French Criminal Code (Nouveau Code Pnal), 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 111 (1995).
8. See Beale & Safwat, supra note 6.
9. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation,
60 WASH. U. L.Q 393, 404-15 (1982) (providing an excellent history of the development of
the American doctrine); Weissmann & Newman, supra note 4, at 417-23 (tracing the history
of the development of the American doctrine of corporate criminal liability); see also infra
notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
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administrative regulations and civil law remedies to hold corporate malfeasance
in check, arguing that those approaches are the functional equivalent of
criminal liability in America.' ° Finally, and more broadly, some have suggested
that American punishment of white-collar crime is but another manifestation
of this country's more general penchant for overcriminalization and harsh
punishment of crime -harsh, that is, in comparison to other countries like
Germany."
. Each of these explanations is surely right, at least in part, and yet each is
just as surely incomplete. For example, Germany and France regulate corporate
behavior largely through administrative and civil laws, but so does the United
States. What makes America so unique is that it imposes significant criminal
liability in addition to those administrative and civil regulations. Similarly,
while it is certainly true that American law developed out of the common law
tradition, one that has never embraced societas delinquere non potest, the United
States has embraced a far more aggressive and far-reaching form of corporate
criminal liability than any other common law country, most notably England. 2
Indeed, corporations today routinely take refuge from the harsh American
regulatory system by listing themselves, not in a Continental law market, but
on the London Stock Exchange.13
What, then, if anything, can explain the uniquely American propensity to
hold corporations criminally liable and to maintain the fiction of entity
culpability? This Note attempts to answer that question by placing corporate
criminal liability within the broader context of the nation's criminal justice
system. Comparing the United States to Germany, this piece argues that
lo. See, e.g., Enriques, supra note 7, at 920 (noting that Germany responded to Enron and other
recent scandals by making civil and administrative remedies more available).
11. See JAMES QWHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003); Coffee, supra note 3, at 195-96, 203-08 (discussing
the expansion of the American criminal code to reach corporate malfeasance and white-
collar crimes that other countries regulate through tort law).
12. See Beale & Safwat, supra note 6; see also Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrine for Destruction: The Case
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 381, 382 (1996) ("Even
within those legal systems largely based on the English legal tradition -Britain, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States -corporate criminal liability heretofore has
been more of a theoretical anomaly than a significant practical reality.").
13. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 2-3, 29-34, 39-44 (2006)
(referencing data suggesting a shift in initial public offerings from New York to London in
the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE
US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 10-14, 16-17 (2007) (same); see also Lawrence
A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323
(2007) (discussing corporations' responses to American and international regulatory
developments).
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corporate criminal liability is not so much the result of increased American
interest in penalizing or regulating corporate behavior but rather a unique
response to, and manipulation of, American criminal procedure and the process
by which the American criminal justice system operates.
The argument proceeds as follows: in the United States, criminal
defendants enjoy significant procedural protections that are either unavailable
or available in more limited form in Germany. The American Constitution of
course affords all criminal defendants a bevy of protective rights that make it
more difficult for prosecutors to interrogate a defendant or uncover evidence.1 4
In the context of white-collar crime in particular, the protection of greatest
significance is the corporate attorney-client privilege, a privilege that has been
read expansively by American courts to shield virtually any conversation
between in-house counsel and employees related to their work."s
Moreover, American defendants engaged in an adversarial system are
guaranteed the assistance of defense counsel, who in turn are given significant
tools to slow an investigation, block the admissibility of evidence, and combat a
conviction at every stage of the proceeding. These difficulties, much like the
evidentiary burdens, are only exacerbated in the context of white-collar
criminal proceedings, in which the underlying facts are likely to be particularly
complex, the investigations particularly time consuming, and the defense
counsel particularly skilled.
But, in return, the American system gives prosecutors tools that simply are
not available to prosecutors in countries like Germany: American prosecutors
have the power to determine whether to bring charges, and if so, what charges
to bring. Moreover, those prosecutors can negotiate plea bargains and demand
that defendants cooperate with an investigation in return. It is by exercising
those powers that corporate criminal liability comes into play in the American
system: by threatening corporations with the prospect of criminal prosecution,
prosecutors force them to plead guilty and then to cooperate in attempts to
prosecute and convict individual corporate directors and employees. 6
14. See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(7th ed. 2004) (providing an overview of the constitutional underpinnings for many
procedural protections enjoyed by American criminal defendants).
15. For a discussion of the privilege, its history, and its scope, see infra notes io8-113 and
accompanying text.
16. See Weissmann & Newman, supra note 4, at 414 ("In the post-Enron world, it is the rare
corporation that will risk indictment by the Department of Justice (DOJ), let alone a trial.
The financial risks are simply too great. Knowing this, the government has virtually
unfettered discretion to exact a deferred prosecution agreement from a corporation. .. ").
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Cooperation, in turn, often involves taking steps to help prosecutors
convict the individual employees also under investigation. Under the guise of
"cooperation," federal prosecutors have compelled corporations to waive the
attorney-client privilege, to complete thorough internal investigations and turn
over any results to prosecutors, and perhaps most controversially, to cut off the
advancement of attorneys' fees to individual employees under investigation.' 7
Not surprisingly, therefore, when a corporation pleads guilty and cooperates,
prosecuting the employees at the center of alleged corporate fraud becomes
remarkably easier.
This Note thus argues that corporate criminal liability in the United States
has developed, at least in significant part, because of the acts of American
prosecutors. Conceptualizing corporate criminal liability in the United States
as a tool used by prosecutors to manipulate unique aspects of American
criminal procedure in an attempt to convict individual employees both helps to
explain why it has taken on such a prominent role in the American adversarial
system and why it has not similarly blossomed in so many European ones.
Indeed, characterizing entity liability as a prosecutorially driven doctrine
explains both its rapid growth in application and the vitriol it inspires in the
business community- attributes that do not attach to corporate criminal
liability in even those foreign countries that have vibrant doctrines of entity
liability.'
8
17. See infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text. Under intense criticism and in response to at
least one court's holding that the practice raised constitutional concerns, the U.S.
Department of Justice recently revised its internal guidelines for federal prosecutors. In
December 2oo6, the department issued the "McNulty Memorandum." Memorandum from
Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Att'ys (Dec.
12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/
20o6/mcnultymemo.pdf. That memorandum replaced the Thompson Memorandum,
which had established Department of Justice policies for prosecuting corporations. See infra
note 176. The McNulty Memorandum dictated that, as a matter of internal policy, federal
prosecutors should no longer consider whether a corporation has advanced attorneys' fees to
its employees in deciding if the corporation has cooperated. See McNulty Memo, supra, at ii.
As this Note went to press, the Department announced further revisions to its policies that
would preclude federal prosecutors from forcing a corporation to waive the attorney-client
privilege. See Robert Schmidt, Justice Dept. Reining in Prosecutors: New Guidelines Issued for
Corporate Fraud Cases, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2008, at Do3; see also United States v. Stein,
435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 20o6) (finding government pressure on a corporation to cut
off advancement of attorneys' fees to individual employees under investigation violated the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of those employees).
iS. The Dutch, for example, have long maintained forms of entity liability comparable in scope
to the American system, see Hefendehl, supra note 7 at 288, but corporate prosecutions are
far more rare - and far less criticized - than they have been in the United States. See Beale &
Safwat, supra note 6, at iii n.94; see also Hans de Doelder, Criminal Liability of
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To make its case, this Note will directly compare the systems of the United
States and Germany. While a number of European nations could serve as
appropriate foils to the American regime, for the purposes of this discussion,
Germany serves as a particularly apt model for comparison. France, England,
Italy, and several other European countries have recently begun cautiously to
experiment with corporate criminal liability, but Germany has remained
steadfast in refusing to hold corporations criminally liable. The contrast
between the German and American systems, thus, is most stark, providing the
ideal basis for this comparative project.19
Relying on that stark contrast, this Note argues that the differences
between the American and German systems do not stem primarily from
different conceptions of what constitutes a crime but rather from the very
different criminal justice systems that the two countries employ. It shall take as
its starting point the fact that both countries adopt traditional conceptions of
white-collar crime; fraud, for example, is illegal in both. The differences in
how those crimes are investigated and prosecuted, however, drives the
discrepancies in corporate criminal liability.
In Germany, corporations face no prospect of criminal liability. But they
also have no power to thwart the investigation and prosecution of individual
employees. There is no corporate attorney-client privilege, for example, or any
general practice of aiding individual employees under investigation through
indemnification. In the United States, the paradigm is reversed: corporations
enjoy an attorney-client privilege and routinely assist individuals under
investigation. They also face the threat of criminal prosecution. But as
suggested above, rarely, if ever, do those corporations actually go to trial.
Instead, in return for agreements to waive the privilege, to deny
indemnification to employees, and to cease any support provided to those
individuals under investigations, corporations are given deals - generally
Corporations-Netherlands, in CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS 289, 291-92 (Hans de
Dodder & Klaus Tiedemann eds., 1996) (noting that while Dutch prosecutors now can
impose entity liability, they often prefer to impose liability on natural persons instead).
ig. Germany, as a large, industrial economy, also serves as an excellent model of comparison for
financial and procedural reasons as well. Indeed, the German-American comparison has
provided the basis for much of the most important work in comparative law, and
comparative criminal procedure in particular, in the last fifty years. See, e.g., MIEJAN R.
DAMAgKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE
LEGAL PROCESS (1986); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY
(1977); James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law,
117 YALE L.J. 340 (2007) (comparing the American economy with the German and French
economies).
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deferred prosecution agreements. ° American prosecutors and corporations
thereby leverage their unique powers, bargaining for an outcome that looks
remarkably similar to the German system: corporations forfeit any protections
and avoid criminal liability, and individual wrongdoers are aggressively
pursued and prosecuted.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I of this Note provides a brief
overview of the development of entity liability in both countries. This history
suggests that prosecutors, rather than legislative bodies, have played a critical
role in crafting the American doctrine. Part II presents the crux of the Note's
argument, drawing distinctions between the American and German criminal
justice systems in two main areas: the gathering and presentation of evidence,
and the powers and roles of prosecutors. Taken as a whole, these differences
create a German system that facilitates the investigation of individual
wrongdoers and an American system that stymies similar prosecutions. Part II
also demonstrates how American prosecutors use their unique powers to
compel corporations to cooperate, thereby enabling them to prosecute the same
type of individuals that the German system pursues. This Note concludes by
offering further thoughts on how the argument presented here can shape not
only the way scholars think about corporate criminal liability in both countries,
but also how lawmakers and practitioners think about reforming the American
system.
I. COMPARATIVE CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. The United States
Until the eighteenth century, the concept of convicting a corporation of a
crime had generally been rejected out of hand. Many believed an entity simply
lacked the moral blameworthiness to be brought within the domain of the
criminal justice system.2' Literalists were troubled by the fact that a corporation
could not physically be haled before a court.22
2o. See infra notes 172-192.
21. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 253, 253 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). For an excellent history of the development
of corporate criminal liability in the United States and England, see generally AMANDA
PINTO & MARTIN EvANs, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIB1LITY 3-17 (2003); and V.S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, lo9 HARv. L. REV. 1477 (1996).
22. See L.H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 3-12 (1969).
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In the United States, those attitudes began to soften during the course of
the nineteenth century when corporations in American society first began to
blossom and their potential to do harm first became significant.23 By the turn
of the twentieth century, as the Industrial Revolution fundamentally altered
the role of large corporations in American life, the need for some mechanism of
regulating and punishing corporate malfeasance became all the more clear. 4
Most histories of American corporate criminal liability" start there-the
Industrial Revolution, the rise of the regulatory state, and the Supreme Court's
landmark 19o9 decision in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United
States.26 In New York Central, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Elkins Act, a federal statute regulating railway rates that imposed criminal
liability on corporations that violated the statute's mandates. In sweeping
language, the Court rejected the corporation's contention that, as an entity, it
could not commit a crime, finding Congress had expansive power to regulate
interstate commerce that included the authority to impose criminal sanctions.
The Court was untroubled by the legal fiction that an entity could neither take
criminal action nor possess criminal intent. Instead, the Court adopted the civil
law doctrine of respondeat superior, holding that a corporation could
constitutionally be convicted of a crime when one of its agents had committed
a criminal act (1) within the scope of his or her employment, and (2) for the
benefit of the corporation. 7 That standard remains good law to this day.
Beginning the history of American entity liability with New York Central is
certainly logical because the case established the authority of Congress to
23. For an excellent history of the correlation between the development of corporate criminal
liability and the growing influence of corporations in modern life, see Brickey, supra note 9,
at 393, 396-97 (noting that "as the corporate form became more common," attitudes toward
corporate criminal liability "changed dramatically" and "common-law judges devised a
theory of corporate accountability for crime").
24. See Parker, supra note 12, at 386-87 (linking the development of corporate criminal liability
directly to the Industrial Revolution and concluding that the doctrine developed fastest
where the Industrial Revolution was most robust); see also Jeffrey S. Parker, The Blunt
Instrument, in DEBATING CORPORATE CRIME 71, 76-77 (William S. Lofquist, Mark A. Cohen
& Gary A. Rabe eds., 1997) (asserting that the development of the American doctrine is
"attributable to a unique confluence of economic and legal conditions in Britain and
America" in the "mid-nineteenth century").
25. See, e.g., KATHLEEN F. BRiCKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND
MATERIALS I (3d ed. 2002) (opening discussion of corporate criminal liability with
reproduction and analysis of New York Central); JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE 43 (2d ed. 2003) (same); JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE
COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 162 (3d ed. 2007) (same).
26. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
27. Id. at 494.
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criminalize corporate conduct. But doing so overlooks a very important
movement that was afoot well before New York Central, one that is critical to
understanding how and why entity liability expanded so rapidly in its wake.
While New York Central involved a statute that explicitly extended criminal
liability to corporations, for some fifty years before Congress passed the Elkins
Act, prosecutors across the country had been creatively pursuing criminal
sanctions against corporations by applying general criminal laws-laws that,
by their terms, did not extend to corporations as entities-to corporate
conduct.
Indeed, as early as the 185os, prosecutors in states like New Jersey and
Pennsylvania aggressively pursued criminal charges against corporations by
applying common law criminal doctrines-most commonly, the crime of
nuisance-to corporations as entities, despite the facts that the common law
did not recognize the concept of entity liability and state laws made no explicit
mention of entity liability.28 Corporations often challenged these prosecutions
with little success on the very grounds that, as entities, they could not be
charged with or convicted of crimes. 9 For the most part, state supreme courts
affirmed the validity of such convictions, finding, for example, that a criminal
"indictment and an information are the only remedies to which the public can
resort for a redress of their grievances." 30
As courts repeatedly upheld such convictions, prosecutors became
emboldened, indicting corporations not just for common law crimes but also
for statutory offenses, even when the statute made no specific mention of entity
liability. Prosecutors in Alaska, for example, indicted a corporation whose
employees had violated a statute prohibiting salmon fishing, concluding that
for purposes of the statute, the employees' conduct and mental state could be
imputed to the corporation.3 Judges, for their part, while acknowledging that
28. See Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (1854);
State v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 23 N.J.L. 36o (1852). Similar cases arose in a number of
other states. See, e.g., President of Susquehanna & Bath Turnpike Rd. Co. v. People, 15
Wend. 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Pittsburgh, Va. & Charleston Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth,
lOl Pa. 192 (1882); State v. Corp. of Shelbyville, 36 Tenn. (i Sneed) 176 (1856).
29. There were some state courts that refused to allow prosecutors to extend criminal laws of
general applicability to corporations, refusing, absent explicit legislative directive, to
consider a corporation to be a "person" for purposes of those states' criminal codes. See, e.g.,
State v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 115 N.E. 772 (Ind. 1917); State v. Cincinnati Fertilizer Co.,
24 Ohio St. 611 (1874); Judge Lynch Int'l Book & Publ'g Co. v. State, 2o8 S.W. 526 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1919); see also Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J.
827, 829-31 (1927) (discussing early state case law).
30. People v. Corp. of Albany, 11 Wend. 539,543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
31. United States v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 1 Alaska 217 (1901).
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many of these amounted to "test cases,"" continued to acquiesce, relying not
on statutory text or theoretical arguments but rather on what could charitably
be termed policy rationales. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
noted in explaining away the historical lack of corporate criminal liability,
"[e]xperience has shown the necessity of essentially modifying [that rule]."33
The true origins of American criminal liability, in other words, did not lie
in legislative efforts, nor did they result from policy debates or logically crafted
statutory choices. Rather, the drive toward entity criminal liability stemmed
primarily from the efforts of American prosecutors who creatively and
aggressively applied statutory and common law and from the early American
courts that allowed them to do so.
That more complete narrative is crucial to understanding why New York
Central marked such a turning point in the history of American entity liability.
By confirming that a corporation could constitutionally be prosecuted for a
crime under a theory of respondeat superior, the Court validated a practice that
had been pursued with increasing frequency by prosecutors for more than fifty
years. Thereafter, with the Court's stamp of approval, prosecutors continued to
aggressively pursue the type of "creative lawyering" they had before, applying
both the common law and statutory offenses to corporate conduct.
Federal prosecutors in particular seized upon the Court's ruling to expand
the reach of federal criminal law. Recognizing that all federal criminal laws
apply to "any person" who violates them and that Congress had defined the
term "person" to include "corporations" for purposes of the U.S. Code more
generally,34 federal prosecutors began applying the criminal code to corporate
conduct. In the years immediately following New York Central, federal
prosecutors charged corporations with individual crimes such as knowingly
mailing obscene materials,3" conspiring to transport liquor onto Indian
32. See, e.g., id. at 225.
33. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. at 345. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, in
upholding Congress's creation of corporate criminal liability in New York Central, seemed to
rely as much on policy rationales as it did on legal principles. Acknowledging the law's
historical aversion to corporate criminal liability, the Court argued that rejecting such
practice was now permissible because the law "cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great
majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted through [corporate]
bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands." N.Y.
Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,495 (1909).
34. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("[T]he words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.").
35. United States v. N.Y. Herald Co., 159 F. 296 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907).
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territory, 6 violating the Espionage Act,3 7 and manslaughter. 8 And lower
courts, faced with the expansive holding in New York Central, went along,
finding the lack of any specific congressional directive that a particular criminal
law be applied to corporations to be, in most cases, irrelevant.39
This is not to suggest that Congress had nothing to do with the expansion
of entity liability. To the contrary, both before and after New York Central,
Congress enacted thousands of statutes creating new or additional criminal
liability for corporations. The Securities Act of 1934, the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, and the Interstate Commerce Act are some of the more well-
known and commonly applied statutes passed in the last century that include
specific provisions for corporate criminal liability.40 Perhaps more important to
this narrative, Congress has enacted thousands of other statutes -statutes that
do not make explicit mention of corporate criminal liability-that aggressive
prosecutors have had little difficulty extending to corporate conduct, including
the mail and wire fraud statutes and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act.4" Moreover, Congress has remained silent in the
wake of those extensions, despite the fact that there is nothing to suggest that,
by defining a "person" to include a "corporation" for purposes of the entire
U.S. Code, Congress thought it was altering the longstanding common law
tradition that entities could not be held criminally liable.42
Nevertheless, the above narrative should at least underscore the very
significant-and for comparative purposes, very unique-role American
36. Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 F. 926 (8th Cir. 1914).
37. United States v. Am. Socialist Soc'y, 26o F. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
38. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
39. See supra notes 35-38. For the most thorough discussion of this history, see Brickey, supra
note 9, at 405-15.
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2000); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(e) (2000); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11,907 (2000).
41. While somewhat out of date at this point, the best history of this expansion is Coffee, supra
note 3. See also Khanna, supra note j.
42. The legislative history of 1 U.S.C. 5 1 is virtually nonexistent and certainly makes no
mention of corporate criminal liability. See 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1512 (noting in its most
recent, significant amendment, congressional intent to broaden the scope of § 1 generally
but making no mention of corporations or criminal liability); see also Note, Decisionmaking
Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091, 1092-99 (1976) (tracing the
history of American corporate criminal liability, noting that much of it is premised on § i's
definition of the term "person" as including a corporation, and concluding that "[b]ecause
of the imprecision of statutory language, the courts rather than Congress have been
primarily responsible for delimiting the circumstances under which corporate entities are
criminally liable").
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prosecutors played in crafting the modern doctrine of corporate criminal
liability. Given the authority to apply the entire criminal code to corporations,
prosecutors could and did make the decision to extend the reach of the criminal
law. Courts, for the most part, affirmed those extensions and the corporate
convictions that accompanied them without question, objecting only
occasionally where prosecutors sought to charge a corporation with crimes
such as rape, murder, or bigamy. 43 That courts imposed some limits on
prosecutors is, of course, of interest. But of far greater importance for the
purposes of this discussion is the fact that an American prosecutor would even
attempt to prosecute a corporation for rape in the first place.
Today, the scope of corporate criminal liability is immense. A corporation
can be prosecuted under virtually any general criminal provision -including
mail and wire fraud statutes, 44 money laundering statutes, 45 and extortion
.statutes46 - or for almost any other conduct that might fall within the purview
of what is considered white-collar crime. By some estimates, there are more
than three hundred thousand federal offenses with which a corporation could
be charged. 47 For the corporation to be convicted, the New York Central test still
applies: prosecutors need only establish that a corporate agent committed an
illegal act while acting within the scope of his employment and intending to
benefit the corporation."8
Moreover, the term "agent" and the "intent to benefit" test have been read
quite expansively by lower courts. Courts have routinely found that a low-level
employee is acting "within the scope of his employment" with an "intent to
benefit" the corporation when he is acting in a manner expressly forbidden by
the company's own internal policies. 49 Corporations can be held criminally
43. See Khanna, supra note 21, at 1484.
44. 18 U.S.C. 55 1341, 1343 (2000).
45. Id. §§ 1956-1957.
46. Extortion and blackmail are covered in several places in the U.S. Code, depending on the
nature and target of the alleged scheme. See id. § 872-877, 1951-1952.
47. Khanna, supra note 1, at 99-1oo.
48. Id. at 98-1oo; see supra text accompanying note 27.
49. See United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4 th Cir. 1985) ("The
fact that many of [the employees'] actions were unlawful and contrary to corporate policy
does not absolve [the defendant-corporation] of legal responsibility for their acts."); United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d OOO, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that the
company can be found liable "for the acts of its agents in the scope of their employment,
even though contrary to general corporate policy and express instructions to the agent").
Moreover, as noted, under current law, corporations are equally liable regardless of whether
the "agent" in question is a top-level manager or a low-level secretary. See, e.g., Riss & Co. v.
United States, 262 F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir. 1958) (finding liability for the conduct of a clerical
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liable whether or not management was aware of the conduct in question, and
they may receive no leniency for having a compliance or oversight system in
place.50
As a result, corporations are routinely threatened and actually prosecuted
for the conduct of individual employees despite the fact that there may be
considerable doubt about whether Congress ever intended for such conduct to
create criminal liability for the corporation as an entity. Consider as one tragic
recent example the prosecution of accounting giant Arthur Andersen for
obstruction of justice relating to its audits of Enron in the years before Enron's
collapse."s The trial judge instructed the jury that it had to find the company
guilty if the prosecutor had established that any employee had ever acted with
an "intent to subvert, undermine, or impede the fact-finding ability of an
official proceeding." 2 Not surprisingly, the jury reached a guilty verdict-
having been so charged, the jury likely could have found almost any American
corporation guilty. 3
Once convicted, a corporation faces statutory penalties that can be
exceptionally high, particularly from a comparative perspective.14 Under a
separate set of corporate sentencing guidelines, 5 American law imposes fines
worker); United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 8oi (2d Cir. 1946) (finding
liability for the conduct of a salesman).
50. See generally Weissmann & Newman, supra note 4, at 423 (noting that under current
American doctrine, "the corporation can be held liable for agents no matter what their place
in the corporate hierarchy and regardless of the efforts in place on the part of corporate
managers to deter their conduct").
51. For an excellent discussion of the case and its questionable expansion of the crime of
obstruction of justice, see Ainslie, supra note 5.
52. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 293 (5th Cir. 2004). Indeed, the
trial judge went on to instruct the jury that it could convict Arthur Andersen "even if [the
company] honestly and sincerely believed that its conduct was lawful." Arthur Andersen,
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005). The judge's jury charge was the basis for a
subsequent appeal and rare reversal by the U. S. Supreme Court. See id. at 708. The Court
found the judge's instruction deficient in that it failed to require the jury to find that the
defendant had acted with a "corrupt" or improper intent to impede a government
investigation. Id. at 705-06.
53. To its credit, the Andersen jury may well have realized the perilous slippery slope it sat
atop -despite Andersen's clear-cut liability under the law, the jury spent more than ten days
deliberating. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 702; Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort
To Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y. TimEs, June 16, 2002, at 1.
54. See generally WHITMAN, supra note n1 (discussing in depth the comparative harshness of
American punishments).
ss. For an excellent discussion of the corporate sentencing guidelines, their current
applicability, and several proposals for change, see Timothy A. Johnson, Note, Sentencing
Organizations After Booker, 116 YALE L.J. 632(20o6).
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that can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars for each offense.
Moreover, any corporation convicted of a felony may be permanently barred
from doing business with government agencies or participating in government
programs, a deprivation that can singlehandedly destroy producers in sectors
from aeronautics (no defense contracts) to pharmaceuticals (no federal funding
for drug research, no reimbursement for welfare recipients receiving
medication)., 6  Finally, the reputational costs can be devastating-the
announcement that the government is even considering criminal charges can
send a company's stock price tumbling, create immediate management
shakeups, or worse. 7
There are two final notes worth emphasizing for the purposes of this
comparative discussion. First, as was true under the Elkins Act, prosecutors
retain the discretion to bring charges against the corporation in addition to -not
in lieu of- any charges brought against the individual officers or employees in
their personal capacity. Indeed, as discussed in Part II, the fact that both
individuals and corporations simultaneously face criminal charges is critical to
understanding the role entity criminal liability plays: by charging both the
corporation and the individuals, American prosecutors rather artificially create
codefendants, and as is so often the case in the American system, one defendant
can then be compelled to plead guilty and cooperate in the prosecution of a
codefendant. s8
Second, corporate criminal liability in no way displaces the extensive
regulatory scheme to which corporations are also subjected. American agencies
such the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) all have
regulatory and enforcement powers.5 9 Such agencies often regulate virtually
every aspect of American business, and more important, can use their
56. The process, known as "debarment," is governed by the Code of Federal Regulations and
authorizes agency officials to debar any corporation convicted of certain felonies, including
"embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false
statements, tax evasion, or receiving stolen property" or any felony "in connection with (i)
obtaining, (ii) attempting to obtain, or (iii) performing a public contract or subcontract."
Debarment, Suspension, and Ineligibility, 48 C.F.R. § 9.4o6-2(a)(1)-(3) (2007).
57. See Weissmann & Newman, supra note 4, at 440-41. For an interesting discussion of the
market effects of the disclosure of criminal investigations on stock prices, see Pamela H.
Bucy, Why Punish? Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CR1IM. L. REV. 1287,
1288-89 (2007) (collecting data on Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom, among others).
58. See infra notes 156-158.
5g. For a general discussion of agency enforcement powers and their relationship to
simultaneous criminal investigations ("parallel proceedings"), see O'SULLIVAN, supra note
25, at 1097-98.
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enforcement power to investigate and "prosecute" alleged wrongdoing. 6° All
such agencies can impose significant fines for violations of their regulations
and can issue rulings and public statements that carry devastating reputational
costs for those targeted.6'
The critical point, therefore, is that American corporate criminal liability
sits atop a pile of punitive and regulatory remedies, as just one very significant
weapon in the government's arsenal.
B. Germany
The story of corporate criminal liability in Germany is considerably
shorter: put simply, there is no corporate criminal liability in Germany. Like so
much of Western Europe, Germany has long resisted the legal fiction that a
corporation could commit a crime. Embracing the principle of societas delinquere
non potest, the German system instead punishes individual corporate officers
and punishes them harshly, especially within the context of a legal regime that
is often considered lenient in comparison to the American system. 62 To this
date, Germany continues to resist corporate criminal liability, even as many of
her neighbors in Western Europe have tentatively begun to change course in
response to recent corporate scandals in the United States and Europe.63
This is not to say the Germans have turned a blind eye to the need to
regulate corporate behavior and punish corporate malfeasance. But it is to say
that they have done so in a different manner: Germany extends its criminal law
to individual corporate directors and agents and punishes them for many of the
same crimes American directors could be accused of, including all forms of
theft and fraud. Germany then relies on administrative and civil law remedies
to regulate and punish the corporation itself.
German laws targeting individual, white-collar criminal conduct are
considerably newer than their American counterparts: the first and second
6o. It is worth noting that agencies, much like federal prosecutors, possess virtually uncabined
discretion to choose which charges to pursue against which potential targets, and can
interpret and stretch the regulatory law in the process. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947) (holding that the agency has power to promulgate new rules and
interpretations of existing rules through individual enforcement actions).
61. See generally MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 77-109 (2006)
(discussing agency regulation of corporations, its influence on corporate behavior, and
corporate criticism of that influence); O'SuLLvAN, supra note 25, at 1097-1136 (discussing
parallel proceedings by agencies and federal prosecutors).
62. See Beale & Safwat, supra note 6, at 107-23.
63. See id.
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German "Acts Combating White Collar Crime" were passed in 197664 and
1986,65 respectively. Over the last three decades, however, Germany has rapidly
expanded the reach of its white-collar criminal laws,66 reduced certain
evidentiary burdens necessary for conviction, and, at the same time, increased
the maximum penalties. Today, the reach of those laws is substantial and their
impact significant, and recent extensions have even sparked criticism that
German white-collar criminal laws have been overextended to include conduct
that could better be handled through the regulatory or administrative
systems.6 7
It is worth noting for comparative purposes that all such expansions have
come directly from explicit legislative changes. As is discussed in far greater
detail in Part II, German prosecutors lack the type of far-reaching and virtually
unbridled authority that American prosecutors possess and have used to
expand entity liability. German prosecutors certainly have not and could not
have contributed to defining the reach of German criminal law. 68
Germany controls and punishes the corporation itself through a system of
administrative regulations that come with the prospect of civil liability. The
German administrative system is technically overseen by criminal courts, and
the penalties imposed can seem quasi-criminal in nature. Fines are the standard
punishment and can reach into the millions of Euros. Corporations can also
face asset forfeiture and forced repayment of illegally obtained gains.69
Despite the undeniably punitive aspect of those fines, however,
corporations in the German system are never accused, let alone convicted, of
"crimes." Instead, they may commit "order violations. ' '7' And while the
punishment imposed is arguably the same-the corporation pays a monetary
fine-the broader "collateral consequences '71 that attach to a criminal
conviction are not present. Indeed, many of the reputational costs associated
64. Erstes Gesetz zur Bekampfung der Wirtschaftskriminalitat [First Act Combating
White-Collar Crime], July 29, 1976, BGBl. I at 2034.
65. Zweites Gesetz zur Bekdrmpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalitit [Second Act Combating
White-Collar Crime], May 15, 1986, BGBI. I at 721.
66. See Bernd Schiinemann, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002: A German Perspective, 8 BUFF. CRiM.
L. REV. 35, 36-39 (2004).
67. See id. at 45 (discussing the "common criticism of the German white collar criminal law"
that it "use[s] ... criminal law for the enforcement of administrative duties").
68. See generally LANGBEIN, supra note 19 (discussing the role of German prosecutors in
comparative terms).
69. See Beale & Safwat, supra note 6, at 123.
70. Id. at 123-24; see Hefendehl, supra note 7, at 286.
71. Moohr, supra note 3, at 173.
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with a corporate criminal conviction in the United States simply do not exist in
Germany. Corporations that commit order violations face no further
government sanction, and in a society in which civil fines are relatively
common and accepted methods of social control, 72 the market response is
generally mild.
C. Comparison
The differences between corporate criminal liability in the United States
and in Western Europe more generally have attracted increasing scholarly
attention, and a variety of different reasons have been articulated for the
discrepancies. For the purposes of this argument, it is important to
acknowledge at least several of the most significant such arguments and to
suggest why each offers an incomplete, if not simply erroneous, explanation.
1. The Criminal Theorist's Account
The first and most obvious explanation given for the differing approaches
is a pure criminal theory argument. That is, Germany, adhering to the
aforementioned principle of societas delinquere non potest, simply does not think
a corporation, as an entity, is capable of committing a crime. More generally, as
a system premised on truth seeking, the German criminal system could not
tolerate the fiction that a corporation had done anything, let alone possessed the
mens rea necessary to be convicted a crime.73 While such an argument is surely
correct on some level, it is unsatisfying, if not incomplete.
From a theoretical perspective, asserting the existence of the principle does
little to explain where that principle came from or where its boundaries are
drawn: Germany, like virtually every country, is willing to adopt the fiction of
a corporation as a separate "person" for purposes of corporate law, bankruptcy
law, and even administrative law.74 In fact, in some respects, Germany carries
72. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REv. 547, 56o-61 (1997); see also Coffee, supra note 3
(highlighting important normative and positive differences between civil and criminal
sanctions).
73. See infra notes 115-138; see also Markus Dirk Dubber, Theories of Crime and Punishment in
German Criminal Law, S3 AM. J. COMP. L. 679 (2005) (analyzing the theoretical
underpinnings of German criminal law and discussing the significance of theoretical
consistency and clarity in the German criminal code generally).
74. For a comparative account of German and American corporate law-and the notion of a
corporation as a separate entity in both-see, for example, Theodor Baums & Kenneth E.
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the fiction further than American law. For example, Germans speak of
corporations as having "privacy" rights, which can prevent the type of civil
discovery that is so prevalent in American litigation."z Simply to assert,
therefore, that the Germans believe a corporation cannot be blameworthy tells
us rather little about why Germany draws that particular line, why a German
corporation can be treated as a "person" in other legal contexts, and perhaps
most important, why a German corporation can be held administratively
accountable or liable for damages in a civil tort action. 6
Moreover, the criminal theorist's account would seem unable to shed much
light on an American doctrine that, by virtually all accounts, has never really
been conceptualized-let alone justified-as consistent with, or grounded in,
traditional criminal theory.77 To accept the criminal theorist's account, one
would have to presume that American thinkers had considered and rejected the
principle of societas delinquere non potest or had endorsed some different
theoretical approach to corporate criminal liability. Neither has generally been
true. Instead, as a pair of scholars recently noted, "nearly every scholarly article
on this topic ... makes a concession to the effect that 'the doctrine of corporate
criminal liability has developed ... without any theoretical justification. '78
The discussion above is not to suggest that the development of American
law has completely ignored the theoretical issues at stake. But it should suggest
Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and
Germany, 53 AM. J. CoMP. L. 31 (2005).
75. The privacy rights at question are actually vested in the individual employees - Germany, as
a member of the European Union, is required to impose stringent "data protection laws"
that prohibit corporations from revealing any private information collected from customers,
employees, or other individuals with which it engages. See Marisa Anne Pagnattaro & Ellen
R. Peirce, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Conflict Between U.S. Corporate Codes of
Conduct and European Privacy and Work Laws, 28 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 375, 415-20 (2007).
The result, however, is often a shield for corporations from discovery or criminal inquiries
to which, for example, American corporations would have no similar defense. See id.; Allen
Shoenberger, Privacy Wars: E. U. Versus U.S.: Scattered Skirmishes, Storm Clouds Ahead, 17
IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 355 (2007) (discussing differences in privacy law between the
United States and the European Union including the recognition of corporate privacy rights
in Germany).
76. It is worth noting, however, that German law does not generally allow for punitive
damages, unlike American law. This limitation, however, applies with equal force to private
and corporate litigants. See Volker Behr, Myth and Reality of Punitive Damages in Germany, 24
J.L. & CoM. 197 (200S).
77. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 21, at 1477-78 (noting that "few have questioned in depth the
fundamental basis for imposing criminal liability on corporations" and that while the spread
of such liability in the United States has provoked "considerable debate, commentators have
not comprehensively analyzed why corporate criminal liability exists").
78. Weissmann & Newman, supra note 4, at 418.
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that criminal theory has only done so much work in this context, and therefore,
that a purely theoretical approach cannot fully explain the differences between
the two systems.
2. The Functionalist Account
A second, commonly offered explanation -what might be called the
"functionalist account"79 - is that Germany merely substitutes individual
accountability and administrative oversight for a regime of corporate criminal
liability. There is undeniably both truth in, and support for, such a
proposition. German legislators and legal theorists provide ample documentary
support for the view that administrative regulation in particular and the "order
violations" imposed are considered regulatory and punitive mechanisms
intended to control corporate malfeasance. 8° Similarly, those same sources
supply evidence that Germans view the punishment of individual corporate
wrongdoers as a more satisfying response to white-collar crime than entity
liability.
The functionalist account, however, seems to falter when one considers
that the United States has individual liability and administrative regulation in
addition to corporate criminal liability. As discussed above, individual directors
can be prosecuted in the United States under the same laws applied to the
corporations themselves, 8' and American agencies such as the FDA, the SEC,
and the more recently created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) 82 all possess the ability to investigate and to punish corporations that
violate their standards and then to impose fines on offending organizations,
79. Functionalism is a school of comparative law that suggests that every society has the same
basic needs-policing corporate behavior, for example-and simply takes different
approaches to that same "function." For an overview of the role of functionalist arguments
in comparative law, see, for example, Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 20o6).
so. Beale & Safwat, supra note 6, at 123-24.
81. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
82. PCAOB, derisively pronounced "peek-a-boo" by practitioners in the field, was created as
part of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While technically a private-sector, nonprofit
corporation, the PCAOB possesses government-authorized regulatory and investigative
powers, and by statute, has the power both to impose penalties and to make referrals to the
SEC for use of its regulatory and enforcement power. For more on the PCAOB and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act generally, see The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
http://www.pcaob.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
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fines that look and seem remarkably like the "order infractions" used in the
German system.
8 3
Finally, it is worth noting that in the few European countries that have
more recently experimented with corporate criminal liability, such as France,
the common sentiment has been that such criminal liability "serve[s] as an
additional tool, not a substitute for other ... sanctions against corporations
themselves or individuals." 8' The functionalist account, therefore, seems
unable to fully explain the discrepancies between the two countries. To suggest
that administrative regulation in Germany takes the place of and serves the
same function as criminal liability in the United States seems an intriguing but
incomplete answer.
3. Enron "couldn't happen here"
A third common explanation for the lack of corporate criminal liability in
Germany is the sentiment within the European community more broadly that
"[Enron] couldn't happen here.,8 ' As a result, the argument goes, Europe
never took the kind of hard-nosed, punitive approach to regulating
corporations that the United States adopted.
86
The underlying argument -what could be called the "European Innocence"
account-was, of course, blatantly wrong. Indeed, "Enron" not only could, but
also did happen in Europe shortly after those very critics disavowed that very
possibility. In the past three years, two of the largest corporations in Europe
have announced internal scandals that easily rival Enron in both significance
and scope. In 2004, the Italian giant Parmalat disclosed that some $8.5 billion
in assets had simply "vanished."8 7 The company changed leadership, and many
of the outgoing directors and the company itself now face criminal charges. 8
83. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
84. Beale & Safwat, supra note 6, at 145.
85. Editorial, Ahold Our, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2003, at 12.
86. See id.
87. Gail Edmondson & Laura Cohen, How Parmalat Went Sour, Bus. WK., Jan. 12, 2004, at 46.
88. See Eric Sylvers, Indictments Are Sought in the Collapse of Parmalat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2004, at Wi. Italy, unlike Germany, has more recently expanded entity liability, and
therefore Parmalat was eligible to be charged and tried for criminal offenses in addition to
its corporate directors. See Emily Backus, Prosecutors Indict 29 in Parmalat Investigation, USA
TODAY, Mar. 18, 2004, at 3B. ("[A] new Italian law allows institutions to be tried in addition
to their employees"). Of significant relevance to this discussion, that recent expansion
followed an attempt at a more general transition in Italy to an adversarial criminal justice
system, one that is now far more in line procedurally with the American approach than the
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In 2006, German-based Siemens disclosed that it was under investigation in
more than a dozen countries, including Germany and the United States, for
allegedly bribing government officials to win government contracts, bid-
rigging, and a variety of other illegal and anticompetitive practices. 8,
Much as with the other explanations offered, the European Innocence
account contains important elements of truth. The rise of corporations as
controlling cultural entities took place considerably later in many European
countries than it did in the United States, and the corresponding fear of the
harm those corporations could do to society is similarly a more recent
phenomenon.9" The European Innocence argument, therefore, might amply
explain why German regulatory and white-collar criminal law blossomed in the
1970s, whereas similar laws in the United States were enacted some three or
four decades earlier. This argument might further explain why some European
countries have recently begun to expand their administrative regulation or even
experiment with corporate criminal liability, in light of evidence that Europe
was, in fact, not that innocent after all.
Yet in light of those developments, not to mention the much longer history
of administrative oversight in countries like Germany, the European Innocence
account feels incomplete, if not erroneous. After all, it is hard to maintain that
European societies, and Germany in particular, had wholly failed to recognize
the risk of corporate malfeasance in light of the extensive administrative
systems in place and the enactment of criminal statutes targeting corporate
directors who committed white-collar crimes. Moreover, as noted, the German
criminal code has been revised repeatedly over the past three decades to
broaden the reach of criminal statutes banning, for example, money laundering
German one. See William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure: The Difficulties ofBuilding an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1992).
89. For a recent overview of the Siemens scandal, see, for example, Mike Esterl & David
Crawford, Suspicious Dealings Worth More Than Thought, Probe Finds: Dubious Transactions
at Siemens Reach $2-3 Billion, Four Times More Than Previous Tally, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 27,
2007, at B17.
go. For a thorough historical development of the regulation of corporations and the
development of corporate law in European countries and the United States, see Beth
Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Legal Origin: A Case
of Institutional Complementarity?, 41 LAw & Soc'¥ REv. 865 (2007). Cf Martin Lipton,
Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987)
("[C]orporate governance ... cannot be created from abstract formalisms or idealized
models of the corporation. Rather, to be effective, the corporate governance reforms
proposed by this generation must address the problems and relationships that characterize
the present state of [a nation's] corporatism.").
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and fraudulent misstatements.91 Such developments strongly suggest an acute
awareness of the growing risk of corporate malfeasance and would seem to
belie any suggestion that European countries genuinely felt immune from the
risks corporate crime posed.
4. The "European Efficiency" Account
One final argument worth noting -what I term the "European Efficiency"
account -relies on the vast body of work suggesting that criminal sanctions for
corporations are inefficient because they do little either to dissuade corporate
malfeasance or to encourage companies to take preventive measures, and that
civil sanctions and administrative regulation can be more readily calibrated to
impose punishments likely to serve both punitive and deterrent ends.92
While such work has not been explicitly raised in the comparative debate, it
can readily and logically be extended: such an account would hold that
European systems forego punitive criminal sanctions in favor of more efficient
civil and administrative regulations. Moreover, such an argument might
explain why corporate crime in Europe, while certainly present and of concern,
has not taken on quite the same scope or severity as it has in the United States:
by creating a more efficient system, the Europeans have effectively shifted
compliance to corporations themselves, without impeding the progress or
creation of internal compliance systems through the enactment of inefficient
criminal penalties.
The problems with the efficiency model, however, are twofold. First, no
European government has explicitly justified its civil or administrative system
on the grounds that such a system is more efficient than a criminal one. 93
Second, and perhaps more important, the efficiency argument fails to explain
why the United States - in light of the virtually undisputed94 scholarly
91. See Roland Hefendehl, Enron, WorldCom, and the Consequences: Business Criminal Law
Between Doctrinal Requirements and the Hopes of Crime Policy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 51, 60
(2004).
92. See, e.g., id. at 74 (citing studies establishing that "civil law reforms -especially that of the
law of associations -have better prospects of success [in controlling corporate behavior]
than does substantive or procedural criminal law"); Parker, supra note 12, at 390.
93. See generally Beale & Safwat, supra note 6 (surveying recent changes in France and Italy
among other countries).
94. There are a few scholars, however, who have suggested that the rise of the criminal law was
a response to "[t] he failure of the civil regulatory scheme ... to prevent or even to report
unlawful conduct in corporate offices" and that, as a result, "federal prosecutor[s] [have
become] the main vindicator of the public interest in lawful business behavior." Moohr,
supra note 3, at 165-66.
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criticism of corporate criminal liability as inefficient- continues to impose
criminal sanctions on corporations, and in fact, does so with increasing
frequency for a growing number of crimes. Put differently, if the efficiency
account is correct, why does the United States -in the face of this undisputed
criticism-continue unabated in its criminal punishment of corporations?
D. Summary
It is that last question that motivates this Note: assuming both the United
States and Germany take seriously the threat of corporate malfeasance, and
knowing that both have significant regulatory systems in place along with
criminal liability for individual officers and agents who engage in illegal
conduct, what purpose - or perhaps, more accurately - what additional purpose
does corporate criminal liability serve in the United States? 9s
In Part II, this Note tackles that question directly. It looks beyond
corporate criminal liability to each country's criminal justice system more
broadly and suggests that corporate criminal liability in the United States has
not grown because of its power to regulate corporate conduct or punish
corporate malfeasance. Instead, the threat of corporate criminal sanctions has
blossomed as a tool of American prosecutors, one that allows them to better
navigate the unique perils of American criminal procedure and to pursue
individual wrongdoers much as their German counterparts do.
II. THE COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACCOUNT
While the above discussion highlighted differences in the substantive
criminal law, the German and American criminal justice systems can far more
readily be distinguished based on their vastly different approaches to criminal
procedure. The American system, built on the common law model, is
adversarial, while the German system has its roots in the Continental
inquisitorial model. The differences between those two approaches permeate
the justice systems in both countries: the traditional inquisitorial system is
dominated by the judge and the court and focuses on finding the "truth."
Lawyers play a relatively minor role, rules of procedure are simple and
95. Indeed, as noted above, criminal sanctions are not considered an efficient response to
corporate misconduct. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick":
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386,
386-87 & n.4 (1981); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
319,321 (1996).
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straightforward, and the court gathers evidence and arrives at a conclusion.
The adversarial system, by contrast, puts lawyers front and center, making the
trial less a truth-seeking endeavor and more of a contest, one with complex and
rigid rules that the most talented contestants and their lawyers can readily
manipulate to their side's advantage.9 6 Put differently, or perhaps more
generally, the German justice system might be compared to the process of
solving a puzzle, with the judge driving a truth-seeking inquiry, one interested
primarily in determining the correct answer. The American system, by
contrast, is more readily analogized to a chess match- one in which lawyers, as
adversaries, play the crucial roles in advocating for victory.
Those differences are exacerbated in the context of the criminal justice
system and white-collar prosecutions in particular. White-collar charges often
involve the most complex factual predicates and nuanced understandings of
guilt: quite literally, there is no "smoking gun," and establishing guilt often
requires prosecutors to pore over millions of documents to prove what the
defendant knew, when he knew it, what his intent was, and why he acted or
failed to act.97 Moreover, white-collar defendants are often able to hire teams of
the best lawyers to advocate on their behalf. Where the goal of the trial is truth
seeking, those realities may slow, but not impede, the march to justice. In the
context of the adversarial system and its chess-match mentality, however, the
difficulties of pursuing white-collar criminal defendants become far more
significant obstacles to the pursuit ofjustice.
It is in the face of these difficulties that the discrepancies between the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems have allowed the very different
approaches to corporate crime to blossom. Or so I shall argue. In particular,
there are two significant types of differences between the American, adversarial
system on the one hand, and the German, inquisitorial system on the other
that, taken in tandem, help to explain why corporations are targets of criminal
charges in the United States but not in Germany. The first difference is
evidentiary. The inquisitorial system, with its focus on truth seeking, is
96. An enormous body of scholarship has explored the differences between the inquisitorial and
adversarial system, including in the context of criminal law. For overviews of the two
systems generally, see, for example, MIRJAN R. DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997);
Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433 (2006); and
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2117-41 (1998).
97. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties of prosecuting and defending white-collar
criminal charges in the American system, see KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME: A PORTRAIT OFATrORNEYS AT WORK (1985).
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generally guided by the principle of "freedom of proof,"' 8 one that both
facilitates the investigatory phase and ensures that as much information as
possible actually makes it into court.99 The adversarial system, by contrast,
often stymies the prosecutor in his attempt to investigate and to introduce
evidence, giving defense counsel tools for objecting to its admission on
grounds that simply would not exist in an inquisitorial court.
The second major type of difference between the two systems falls into
what I will broadly term "prosecutorial powers." The distinctions here are
critical: American prosecutors possess great discretion to bring charges in the
first place, to determine what charges to bring, and perhaps most important of
all, to negotiate plea bargains. German prosecutors, by contrast, are far more
limited public servants, ones given almost no discretion and overseen far more
closely by judges and courts. German prosecutors are required to bring charges
if the facts support doing so, are limited to charging only the specific offense
provided for by statute, and have very limited power to negotiate deals with
defendants.'
When combined, the above differences between the two criminal systems
produce the following divergent results: American prosecutors leverage the
powers they possess over corporations, as defendants, to facilitate the
prosecution of individual directors otherwise protected by American criminal
procedure. German prosecutors, by contrast, have neither the power nor,
critically, the need to engage in such indirect tactics, since German criminal
procedure facilitates, rather than hinders, the prosecution of individual
wrongdoers.
In other words, American corporate criminal liability can and should be
seen as part of an effort by American prosecutors to pursue individual
corporate directors- the same directors who would be targeted by the German
criminal system. Reaching that conclusion requires further elaboration of the
differences, and an understanding of how those differences play out in the
context of actual investigations and prosecutions in both countries.
A. The Evidentiary Differences
While much is often made of the rather arcane set of American evidentiary
rules, which have no place in a truth-seeking, inquisitorial system, the
98. See J.R. Spencer, Evidence, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 594, 6O2 (Mireille
Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds., 1995).
99. See infra notes 104-113 and accompanying text; see also DAMA KA, supra note 96, at 15.
ioo. See infra notes 161-171 and accompanying text.
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evidentiary burdens placed on American prosecutors begin well before the trial
where those rules apply. Indeed, from the initial complaint through the
investigation, American prosecutors are hampered by rules and restrictions -
whether statutory or constitutional- that are foreign to the inquisitorial
system.
In the American system, investigations and the gathering of evidence are
handled primarily by the police, who are overseen and directed by the
prosecutor. Judges may be consulted if a warrant is needed or if there is a
question of law involved, but they otherwise play no direct role in the
investigation.' Because the investigation is directed by the prosecutor, it, like
the ensuing trial, takes the adversarial form. As a result, American defendants
have no obligation to talk to or cooperate with the investigators -that is, with
their adversaries-and if they do, they have a well-established and protected
right to have counsel present at any such meetings. For indigent defendants
relying upon court-appointed counsel, that protection may not seem terribly
significant. But white-collar criminal defendants are rarely indigent, and for
such defendants, the right to have counsel present during the investigatory
stage is effectively a call to arms: corporate leaders under investigation
routinely hire teams of attorneys from the best firms in the country to work
tirelessly to stave off a criminal indictment."0 2
For purposes of this discussion, it is also worth noting just who is paying
for that squadron of lawyers, whose fees, over the course of even a small
investigation, can run into the millions of dollars. By contract or company
custom, most mid- and high-level American employees have a right to
corporate indemnification -that is, to have their employers pay their legal fees
for any criminal investigation relating to their work conduct.0 3 There is little
doubt that without indemnification agreements, even the best-paid corporate
executives would be unable to afford the type of legal protection deep corporate
pockets can provide. 10 4  From the prosecutor's perspective, therefore,
corporations play a crucial role in helping their employees combat, if not evade,
criminal investigation and prosecution.
iO. For a discussion of the American investigatory system in a comparative context, see Yue Ma,
A Comparative View ofJudicial Supervision of Prosecutorial Discretion, 44 CRuM. L. BuLL., Jan.-
Feb. 2008, at 31.
102. See MANN, supra note 97.
103. See generally 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1344.1o, at 556-66 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002) (discussing the
history and modern practice of corporate indemnification agreements).
104. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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The role those squadrons of attorneys play -and the adversarial nature of
their relationship with the prosecutor -then becomes critical to the process of
investigating and gathering evidence. Defense attorneys have a right to oversee
the execution of search warrants and subpoenas and to contest the
admissibility of each piece of evidence thereby obtained. Assisting them in that
process is the aforementioned set of arcane American evidentiary rules, adopted
from common law and preserved despite decades, if not centuries, of scholarly
criticism. ' Those include, for example, prohibitions on hearsay °6 or "bad
character" evidence, 0 7 evidence that might be particularly relevant to helping a
jury determine whether a corporate executive knew-or did not know-what
exactly he was doing.
Perhaps the most crucial evidentiary rule in this context is that of corporate
attorney-client privilege. In the United States, much as corporations can be
"persons" for the sake of the criminal code, they are "persons" for the purposes
of privilege laws. A judicially developed doctrine, the corporate attorney-client
privilege, while once narrow, has greatly expanded since its inception.10
Today, it covers virtually anything discussed between in-house corporate
counsel and any company employee, provided that the communication pertains
to the employee's official responsibilities and can be characterized as related to
the attorney's representation of the company.1"9 The corporate privilege, thus,
105. See, e.g., Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the
Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2006) (collecting scholarship critiquing the
American evidentiary rules); see also DAMA§KA, supra note 96, at 7-25 (criticizing the
development of American evidentiary rules).
1o6. See FED. R. EID. 8Ol-807 (generally excluding hearsay with certain, narrow exceptions). See
generally 2 CHARLEs T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 244-53, at 122-77
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (discussing the hearsay exception).
107. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (excluding generally any "evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character"); FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (excluding mention of any prior convictions). See
generally 1 McCORMICK, supra note lo6, § 19o, at 752-68 (discussing the bad character
evidence exception).
io8. The corporate attorney-client privilege was first recognized by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915), and was, for some time,
limited to communications between attorneys and the corporation's top management or
"control group." That rule has since been abandoned and the privilege greatly expanded. See
infra note lo9 and accompanying text.
iog. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In Upjohn, the Court noted four
factors that compelled its finding that the privilege attached, although it made clear the four
were not necessary to such a finding in all cases. These factors were as follows: (1) the
communications were made to corporate attorneys to facilitate their provision of legal advice
to the company; (2) the communications were made at the request of the employee's
superiors; (3) the communications concerned matters within the scope of the employee's
corporate duties; and (4) the communications were treated as confidential, attorney-client
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can shield as protected anything from legal advice given to senior management
to general statements of legal advice or policy distributed widely throughout
the corporation.' ° Much like the individual privilege, the corporate attorney-
client privilege also protects attorney work product- including any internal
investigations or inquiries into the underlying conduct made by corporate
counsel. "'
The privilege is held by the company, not any individual employee, which
means that the corporation has the authority to invoke it or to waive it."2 But
because of its breadth, once invoked, it can and does block American
prosecutors from obtaining all sorts of internal company records and
correspondence -often the type of information necessary to establish what the
defendant knew or did not know when authorizing the illegal behavior in
question."3
Finally, it is worth noting that much as the corporate lawyer is said to have
an attorney-client relationship with all corporate employees, the in-house
lawyer is also said to represent all such employees. Thus, when a corporation
comes under investigation, it can and will claim that all of its employees are
represented by counsel, thereby making it impossible for law enforcement
officers or prosecutors to contact any individual employees without first going
through the corporation's counsel. 14 As a result, cultivating sources within a
company and finding whistleblowers becomes much more difficult.
communications at the time they were made. Id. at 394-95. For more on the corporate
attorney-client privilege, its history, and its current scope, see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.16, at 336-46 (3d ed. 2003).
11o. See, e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982) (holding that the
availability of legal opinion memoranda to much of the corporation did not destroy the
privilege).
Ill. See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383 (finding that an internal investigation of potential tax fraud
conducted by the corporation's in-house attorney was privileged and thus could not be
obtained by IRS investigators).
112. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) ("[F]or
solvent corporations, the power to waive the corporate attorney-client privilege rests with
the corporation's management and is normally exercised by its officers and directors.").
113. See also Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
Waiver Problem, S7 DEPAUL L. REV. 295, 299-300 (2008) (discussing the type of information
sought and obtained through waiver).
114. See also JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 172-73 (5th ed. 2002) (discussing the "delaying game" whereby corporate counsel use
the privilege as leverage to secure a deal for the corporation, threatening otherwise to thwart
the investigation of individual wrongdoers). See generally The Thompson Memorandum's
Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, lo9th Cong. 117-18 (2006) (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen. of
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By contrast, the German inquisitorial system is guided by the Prinzip der
materiellen Wahrheit, or the principle of factual truth, a principle that guides
both the investigation and the ultimate trial." 's Indeed, unlike an American
investigation, which is adversarial in nature, the court in Germany oversees
investigations, rendering them a critical component of the search for the truth.
While prosecutors and police still play the primary role in the day-to-day
investigation, the process is not adversarial. Moreover, the judge, not the
prosecutor, has the final say on whether enough evidence has been gathered,
and a judge unsatisfied with the evidence adduced at trial can direct police to
investigate further or to produce certain information." 6
At the investigatory stage,"7 prosecutors oversee the gathering of relevant
information that will then be presented to the judge at trial. Because
prosecutors are as much officers of the justice system as they are "adversaries,"
they are given the authority to engage in what Americans would view as
coercive tactics. Most notably, German prosecutors can require the defendant
to attend an interview with investigators." 8 While the suspect must be
informed of several rights, including the right to remain silent, unlike in the
American system, the German defendant has no right to have an attorney
present at the initial interrogation, let alone a team of attorneys." 9 Indeed,
German prosecutors or judges can exclude a defendant's lawyer from the
interrogation if the lawyer's presence would be a "danger to the success of the
investigation." 2
Moreover, even at subsequent proceedings where a German defendant is
entitled to have an attorney present, he is limited to three lawyers, total. 2 ' And
the United States) (discussing how corporate counsel can use privilege to block criminal
investigations if they so choose).
11s. Rodolphe Juy-Birmann, The German System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra
note 98, at 292, 309.
116. See id.
117. The German criminal justice system is generally divided into three phases: the preparatory
stage (Vorverfahren), the intermediate phase (Zwischenverfahren), and the trial
(Hauptverfahren). See id. at 312-15. This Note uses the terms "investigatory stage" and
"preparatory stage" interchangeably.
iS. Strafprozefordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Feb. 1, 1877, Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGBI.] 253, as amended, § 163a, III, sentence 1.
119. Juy-Birmann, supra note 115, at 320.
120. Id. at 304 (quoting Strafprozefgordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Feb. 1, 1877,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1.] 253, as amended, § 168c, V, sentence 2).
121. See Christian Fahl, The Guarantee of Defence Counsel and the Exclusionary Rules on Evidence in
Criminal Proceedings in Germany, 8 GERMAN L.J. 1053, 1053 (2007) (quoting
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the German defendant is far more likely to pay for those attorneys -
indemnification agreements, while increasingly popular in the European
Union, have never been as prevalent as they are in the United States. In
Germany in particular, indemnification agreements remain an "exceptional
practice." '2 As a result, white-collar German defendants are unable-for both
legal and financial reasons-to assemble the types of legal "dream teams"
American executives so frequently rely on to fend off criminal prosecution.
None of this is to suggest that the German system mistreats defendants or
denies them all forms of protection. To the contrary, the entire German system
operates on the principle that basic human dignity must always be preserved.'23
But despite providing for that standard, the German system also preserves the
search for the truth, eschewing the type of prophylactic rules and procedural
formalism that the United States imposes.
This approach permeates Germany's evidentiary rules. Germany, like most
inquisitorial systems, favors the principle of, as the French term it, liberti des
preuves-liberty of proof-which is to say that evidence is presumptively
admissible.'" In Germany, evidence is said to be "free" -Freibeweis' 5 - and the
role and responsibility of all parties appearing before the court is to provide the
relevant information to the judge so that he can reach the factually correct
result. In more concrete, comparative terms, this means that many of the rules
that block the admission of evidence in the American system are not nearly as
significant in the German one: hearsay is generally admissible, for example, as
is evidence of prior bad acts or "bad character" evidence."6
Perhaps most important to my argument is the fact that Germans do not
embrace the same form of broad exclusionary rule loathed by American
prosecutors and revered by American criminal defense lawyers. In the German
system, like the American one, evidence may be excluded if it was improperly
or illegally obtained. Unlike the American system, however, the German
criminal code defines "improper" or "illegal" methods to be those that
undermine the credibility of the evidence itself-if, for example, the police used
torture or took advantage of severe fatigue or mental handicap, any evidence
Strafprozefordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Feb. 1, 1877, Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGBI.] 253, as amended, § 137, I, sentence 2).
122. See Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX.
L. REv. 1385, 1429 (20o6) ("In Germany ... indemnification of directors is not explicitly
addressed by company law and has traditionally been an exceptional practice.").
123. See Spencer, supra note 98, at 607.
124. Id. at 602.
125. Juy-Birmann, supra note 115, at 325.
126. See Spencer, supra note 98, at 616-19.
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thereby obtained may be excluded. '27 Judges may also exclude evidence that
violates the defendant's allgemeines Personlichkeitsrecht, or "universal right of
human personality.,12 8 Such evidence tends to include that which the court
feels the police should not have obtained in the first place-personal diaries of
witnesses, for example, or unauthorized tape recordings of private
conversations. 12 9
Germany otherwise has no blanket rule that evidence obtained in violation
of criminal procedures automatically need be excluded. 3' Evidence is certainly
not excluded to deter police misconduct, unlike in the United States where
such deterrence is a primary justification for, and explanation of, the American
exclusionary rule.13' As one scholar noted, "Although it does not make much
sense that there are rules governing the collection of evidence that may be
disobeyed without consequences, this is the predominant opinion in Germany
among the courts and in books on criminal law. The courts fear that otherwise
too much evidence will be lost."'32 Not surprisingly, as a result, the total amount
of evidence excluded by a German court would pale in comparison to that
deemed excludable in an American one. 33
But in the context of white-collar crime, the evidentiary rule-and the
difference-of greatest impact is the corporate attorney-client privilege. Here,
the differences are stark: while in America, any conversation between an
employee and an in-house lawyer can be privileged, in Germany the privilege is
far more limited. Like most European countries, Germany views in-house
lawyers as fundamentally different from the rest of the bar. In France, for
instance, in-house lawyers have no attorney-client privilege because they are
not deemed sufficiently independent to warrant such protection. 34 German law
is only slightly more protective: in-house lawyers are entitled to the protection
of the privilege provided that they maintain separate offices, to which they
127. See id. at 607 (describing the law on Beweisverwertungsverbote or "prohibitions on use of
evidence" as codified at Strafprozefgordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Feb. i,
1877, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI.] 253, as amended, § 136a).
128. Id. at 607 n.46.
129. Id.
130. See Fahl, supra note 121, at io6i.
131. Id.
132. Id. (emphasis added) (collecting cases demonstrating this attitude on the part of German
courts).
133. See Spencer, supra note 98, at 607-08 (discussing the more limited exclusion of evidence in
Germany).
134. Joseph Pratt, The Parameters of the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel at the
International Level, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. &BUS. 145, 166 (1999).
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have sole access, and that they answer to a general counsel who acts in his
independent capacity as an attorney.13 More important, under German law,
even that limited privilege applies only to records or documents possessed by
the lawyer and not to anything held by the defendant. Therefore, when
German investigators search the defendant's office, the thousands of
documents they find-documents that would be presumptively privileged in
the United States-are presumptively admissible in Germany.'
36
Taken as a whole, these rules make it notably, if not significantly, easier for
German prosecutors to amass the sort of information they would need to
prosecute individual officers or agents of a corporation believed to be engaged
in wrongdoing. 3 7 Moreover, as noted, where prosecutors fail to amass such
evidence on their own, judges can and will use the trial itself as an opportunity
to ask questions, to demand further information, and ultimately to determine
what occurred.' 38
American prosecutors, of course, are not powerless in the face of these
unique evidentiary burdens. But their powers are very different, and, thus,
their use of those powers in the context of otherwise similar white-collar
prosecutions creates a very different result.
B. Prosecutorial Powers
As a preliminary observation, it is worth noting that American prosecutors
are American lawyers. As such, they are by nature adversarial, which is to say,
competitive. Far from being neutral officers of the court, American prosecutors
have the responsibility not only to present straightforward facts to a court, but
also to advocate for their version of those facts. And while no self-respecting
prosecutor would deny that truth seeking is at the heart of his work,'39
American prosecutors, like all American lawyers, play to win. Prosecutors are
135. See id. at 167.
136. Id. at 161-62.
137. Cf Moohr, supra note 3, at 200 (noting that the inquisitorial system "avoids or, more
specifically, neutralizes" the problem of "the secrecy with which white collar crimes are
committed").
138. See Denis Salas, The Role of the Judge, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra note 98, at
488,489.
139. Not surprisingly, prosecutors often view criminal defense attorneys as the source of abuses
in the American system, abuses that prosecutors seek to curtail if not correct. As the
standard saying goes, "Criminal defense lawyers play close to the line. Prosecutors play in
the center of the court." Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FoRDHAM
URB. L.I. 607, 617 (1999).
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invariably measured by how successful they are-their conviction rate.
Particularly in state systems, where local prosecutors routinely stand election,
conviction rates are invariably on the minds of even the most job-secure district
attorneys.1 40 Moreover, as adversaries in an adversarial system, American
prosecutors remain far more independent of the court and the judiciary than do
their German counterparts.' 4 ' American prosecutors are located within a
separate branch of government from judges, and, as a result, prosecutors make
a wide variety of crucial choices that judges are not authorized to review, let
alone reverse. This "prosecutorial discretion" includes the virtually unbridled
authority' 42 to decide when to bring charges against a defendant, what those
charges should be, and when to offer the defendant a plea bargain to avoid an
otherwise onerous penalty. 43 Each of those sets of choices, in turn, deserves
further attention. The discretion to charge means that a prosecutor faced with a
sympathetic defendant can simply decide, based on his own instinct, not to
proceed to trial. Perhaps of greater relevance here, the prosecutor can also
choose not to press charges when the target of an investigation proves
cooperative or offers to help the government investigate other potential
criminals. Retaining discretion thus gives prosecutors virtually unreviewable
power to determine when, and against whom, the criminal law will be
enforced. 44
The discretion to choose what charges to bring, in turn, contains two
distinct but very important powers. First, the choice of what charges to bring,
140. Perhaps no case more publicly demonstrated this pressure and the manner in which it could
affect criminal investigations than the recent Duke lacrosse team rape allegations. For a
scathing account of that scandal and the role public pressure played on the district attorney,
see STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT (2007).
141. For an excellent recent article comparing American prosecutors to their counterparts in
Germany, France, and Italy and discussing in particular the unique discretion and freedom
enjoyed by American prosecutors, see Ma, supra note 1o1.
142. As a general rule, courts will only second-guess a prosecutor's exercise of this authority
when a defendant claims that a prosecutor exercised his discretion in a discriminatory
manner. Even there, the "presumption of regularity" applies to the prosecutor's conduct:
"Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand
exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused."
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1986).
143. See generally Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDAM URB. L.J. 553 (1999) (discussing the series of powers
prosecutors exercise when operating "outside the rules" or beyond the reach of formal legal
restraint, including making investigatory, charging, and plea-bargaining decisions).
144. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1521 (1981)
(providing a theoretical and normative critique of the role of prosecutorial discretion in the
American justice system).
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when coupled with a complex statutory framework that tends to
overcriminalize, 4 s gives prosecutors the ability to charge a defendant with
multiple counts arising from the same underlying conduct, and, as a result, to
impose additional pressure on them to plead guilty. Martha Stewart, for
example, was charged not only with obstruction of justice but also with
securities fraud for the same underlying offense -lying about her involvement
in and knowledge of the sale of ImClone stock.146
Second, the choice of what charges to bring -and the fact that such a choice
is unreviewable- gives prosecutors a significant role in shaping the criminal
code. Statutes like the RICO Act 147 or the mail and wire fraud statutes148
contain broad prohibitions and vague language that has been manipulated by
prosecutors in attempts to punish conduct that might not otherwise neatly fit
into the federal criminal code. The wire fraud statute, for example, has been
used to prosecute a man who impersonated a talent scout to score dates with
models.'49 The Hobbs Act, a federal robbery statute ostensibly targeting bank
robberies and other major larcenies, 5 ' was written so broadly that, as one
commentator observed, it "seems literally to apply to the robbery of a candy
store by a local hoodlum. 15 1
This prosecutorial power to shape the criminal code is critical in this
context. As noted in Part I, many criminal statutes do not contain explicit
provisions for corporate or entity liability. Nevertheless, prosecutors have
applied them to corporate behavior by arguing that the criminal code covers all
"persons," and that the U.S. Code generally defines "person" to include a
corporation or an organization. 152 Of course, Congress has not yet stepped in to
145. As used in this context, the term "overcriminalize" speaks both to the legislative tendency to
make criminal what should not be, and the tendency to pass multiple laws covering similar,
if not identical, conduct. For a greater discussion of both tendencies in the American system,
see, for example, Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703
(2005). See also Moohr, supra note 3, at 181 ("The depth of the federal criminal law-
duplicative statutes that apply to similar conduct-increases the prosecutorial power . .. by
giving prosecutors a plethora of offenses from which to choose.").
146. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar
Criminal Law, 43 Hous. L. REv. 591 (20o6) (providing an in-depth discussion of the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion in the context of the prosecution of Martha Stewart).
147. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
148. Id. §§ 1341-1343.
149. See United States v. Altman, 9O1 F.2d 1n61 (2d Cir. 199o).
is0. 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
IsI. PETERW. Low, FEDERAL CR1MINAL LAW 7 (2d ed. 2003).
Is2. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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overrule that interpretation by, for instance, revising the U.S. Code. But far
more important, neither have the courts."5 3 In Germany, as discussed at greater
length below, the judge plays an instrumental role in evaluating the charges
brought and approving them as being "correct." In the United States, as
Professor Geraldine Moohr has noted, the "pattern... [of] prosecutors raising
new interpretations and courts acceding to them ... leads to an incremental,
but inexorable, expansion of the laws." ' 4
The final of the three discretionary powers worth discussing is the power to
offer and negotiate plea bargains, a power which controls, if not coerces,
defendants in a slightly less direct fashion. Plea bargains in the United States
operate within a justice system in which sentences are exorbitant, at least from
a comparative perspective, and even relatively minor crimes can lead to life-
changing prison time. ' Pleas offer a way of avoiding, or at least reducing,
those sentences. As a result, in modern America, some ninety-four percent of
criminal charges end in plea bargains without a jury ever being empaneled, let
alone rendering a verdict.'6
But in addition to forcing defendants to forego a trial, prosecutors obtain
another power through the ability to negotiate pleas: American prosecutors can
force defendants, as a condition of pleading guilty, to cooperate and to help
authorities with other investigations. Most commonly, cooperation entails
testimony against codefendants, testimony which helps prosecutors convict
criminals who might otherwise evade the criminal justice system. The power to
negotiate plea bargains, in other words, is not just a means for prosecutors to
reduce their case load. Rather, plea bargaining gives prosecutors a critical tool
for investigating and prosecuting other criminals." 7 And while statistics are
1s3. See Moohr, supra note 3, at 181 (noting that, in the context of white-collar crime in
particular, "[It]he combination of ambiguous conduct and broad, vague statutes enhances
prosecutorial power by implicitly authorizing prosecutors to classify certain conduct as
criminal").
154. Id. at 179. Some of the most noted scholars in the field have expressed similar thoughts. See,
e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 11o HARV. L. REV. 469
(1996); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1999); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
155. See WHITMAN, supra note 11.
156. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463,
2497 (2004) (citing U.S. Department of Justice statistics that between ninety-four and
ninety-five percent of federal criminal defendants plead guilty).
157. See Stephen S. Trott, Dep't of Justice, The Successful Use of Informants and Criminals as
Witnesses for the Prosecution in a Criminal Case, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION
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difficult to come by, some have estimated that most criminal prosecutions that
actually go to trial rely on cooperator testimony in some form.s Finally, it is
worth reiterating that prosecutors not only have the power to make the above
decisions, but they have the power to make them alone. An aggrieved victim,
angered that charges were not filed, cannot sue to compel prosecution.5 9 The
"local hoodlum" charged with violating the Hobbs Act cannot ask the judge to
reduce the charges.'6 Above all, a defendant facing the option between
pleading guilty or going forward with a trial that would result in a death
sentence will likely feel compelled to accept the deal.
German prosecutors-and the powers they exercise-look nothing like
their American counterparts. German prosecutors are required by law to
investigate all accusations brought to them. 6 ' They are then bound by the
"legality principle" -Legalitatsprinzip62- to press charges if the initial
investigation turns up sufficient evidence to warrant proceeding. There is no
significant discretion involved.
Indeed, the legality principle is a core component of the German system,
and until 1975, it was virtually absolute. More recently, German law has relaxed
the requirement under certain, limited circumstances, giving prosecutors a
CASES 115, 119-20 (1988) ("If a policy were adopted never to deal with criminals as
prosecution witnesses, many important prosecutions could never make it to court.").
iS8. See id.; see also United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3 d 1297, 1301 (ioth Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(affirming the legality of offering more lenient plea bargains to cooperating witnesses in
return for their testimony, while noting that "[n]o practice is more ingrained in our criminal
justice system than the practice of the government calling a witness who is an accessory to
the crime for which the defendant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea
bargain that promises him a reduced sentence") (citations omitted).
159. See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a
federal court lacked the authority to compel a prosecutor to bring charges against prison
guards who allegedly assaulted the plaintiffs while in custody).
16o. The only exception to this is where the defendant asserts that, as a matter of law, he cannot
be guilty of the crime charged. Such challenges, which often invoke the rule of lenity -that
is, that the meaning and scope of criminal laws should be read strictly and in the light most
favorable to the defendant-are rarely successful, as judges almost always defer to
prosecutors' and juries' views of what the law criminalizes. See MARKuS D. DUBBER & MARK
G. KELmAN, AMEUCAN CRIMINAL LAw 123-44 (2005) (discussing rule of lenity challenges by
defendants and American courts' increasing hostility toward them); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity
and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 346 ("Judicial enforcement of
lenity is notoriously sporadic and unpredictable.").
161. This is known as Grundsatz der Strafverfolgung durch den Staat or Offizialprinzip, and is
codified at Strafprozegordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Feb. 1, 1877,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI.] 253, as amended, § 152, 5 1. See also Juy-Birmann, supra note 115,
at 308 (discussing the requirement imposed on German prosecutors to investigate).
162. Juy-Birmann, supra note 115, at 338-39.
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modicum of discretion. But even then, the decision not to prosecute generally
requires the approval of a presiding judge. 6, Moreover, should the prosecutor
decide not to press charges and should the presiding court sign off on that
decision, the victim then has the right to effectively take over the prosecution
by filing a Privatklage, or private complaint. 64 Should charges be appropriate,
German prosecutors also have far less control over what charges to bring for
two reasons. First, the German system-like most Continental systems- leaves
far less uncertainty in the criminal code and gives lawyers less room to push or
mold the law through the type of "creative lawyering," practiced by American
lawyers. 6' The German prosecutor's role is not to choose among many
possibilities, but to determine the "correct" charges to bring and then to file
them in an indictment. Second, and perhaps more important, German
prosecutors must then submit the charges to a judge who has the authority to
alter the charges if he feels they do not adequately reflect the alleged
conduct. 
66
German prosecutors also possess far less authority to offer or to negotiate
plea bargains. In fact, until 1979, Germany was, as Professor John Langbein
termed it, a "land without plea bargaining. ''16 7 While more recent reforms have
eased that rule, plea bargaining remains drastically more limited than it is in
the United States. Today, the most common form of German plea bargaining
163. See, e.g., Strafprozegordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Feb. 1, 1877,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1.] 253, as amended, § 153b, 9 1 (allowing for charges to be dropped
on the grounds that the sentence would be inappropriate, but only with consent of the
court); id. § 153, I, sentence I (allowing for charges of minor importance to be dropped but
only with the court's permission).
164. Juy-Birmann, supra note i15, at 319.
165. Unlike the American system which allows for law to develop through application, most civil
law countries require that the law develop solely through the development of the code. See
generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 34-36 (2d ed. 1985)
(discussing differences between the development of law in civil law and common law
countries); RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 296-98 (5th ed. 1988)
(discussing the roles of courts and legislatures in the development of law).
166. Strafprozegordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Feb. 1, 1877, Reichsgesetzblatt
[RGBI.] 253, as amended, § 165, 1, sentence 1 (giving judges the authority to substitute
charges provided the new charges are based on conduct included in the initial accusation);
see also Juy-Birmann, supra note 115, at 314; Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in
Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COmp. L. 199, 215 (20o6) (noting that
German "[j]udges also have substantial control over the charges filed" including the
authority to substitute, adjust, and even dismiss charges, and that, in that process, "judges
can probe into the relevant facts on their own initiative, going beyond the investigative file
compiled by the police and presented by the prosecution").
167. John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REv.
204 (1979).
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involves only low-level offenses for which the defendant promises to pay civil
restitution or a fine in return for having the charges dropped. 6 ' Germany is
also currently developing a form of "sentencing bargaining"-a reduced
sentence in return for the admission of guilt-that looks more akin to
American plea bargaining but with one crucial distinction: in Germany, the
entire process is overseen by a judge who will hear the defendant's confession,
determine its validity, and then proceed to sentence appropriately. 6 9
Moreover, it is worth noting that one of the key reasons plea bargaining
has less relevance in the German system is that sentencing, far from being
dictated by guidelines as it is in the United States, 170 is left generally to the
discretion of the judge. While most crimes in the German code will provide for
a maximum penalty, judges are free to impose a punishment they feel most
accurately reflects the defendant's culpability, the seriousness of his crime, the
defendant's prior criminal history, and the like.17 1 German prosecutors,
therefore, would be unable to do what their American counterparts can-
threaten a particular (harsh) sentence and promise a far more lenient one in
return for a plea.
C. Finishing the Explanation: How the American System Works in Practice
Thus far, this Note has described differences between the American and
German systems. It has attempted to establish how the American system, on
the one hand, hamstrings prosecutors pursuing individual white-collar
defendants, but on the other hand, gives them enormous power over potential
defendants and the targets of investigations. Completing the argument -that
is, showing how the prominence of corporate criminal liability in the United
States has been driven by prosecutors responding to those evidentiary
burdens - requires considering the two aspects of the American system
together and analyzing how prosecutors have used the above described powers
168. See Turner, supra note 166, at 218-19 (discussing the application of section 153(a) of the code
and how it is limited to crimes punishable by one year or less in prison).
169. See id. at 219-21.
170. More recent Supreme Court opinions have rendered the sentencing guidelines as
nonbinding, giving judges greater discretion in sentencing defendants. Nevertheless, the
guidelines play a very important role in American sentencing, and large departures from the
sentencing guidelines remain the exception to the rule. See Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis,
Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State of Sentencing After United States v. Booker, 41 U.
RICH. L. REV. 625 (2007).
171. Turner, supra note 166, at 215-16 (collecting statutes and providing interviews with German
judges discussing the sentencing process).
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against corporations to overcome evidentiary burdens they face in prosecuting
individuals.
In particular, the recent American prosecutorial practice of using
cooperation agreements - generally in the form of "deferred prosecution
agreements" - and the terms and conditions American prosecutors have
attached to those agreements shed considerable light on the validity of the
argument advanced thus far.
1. The Thompson Memorandum and the Use of "Deferred Prosecution
Agreements"
In the years since Enron, pursuit of corporate malfeasance has increased
significantly, and a large number of corporations have come under
investigation. Yet virtually none of those corporations has actually gone to trial.
With very few exceptions, every such corporation has been offered a deal-
often a deferred prosecution agreement or "DPA" - in return for the company's
cooperation with the government's investigation. '72 Corporations, well aware
of the harm that an indictment, let alone a conviction, would cause, have
eagerly accepted such deals. As one pair of scholars recently noted, "In the
post-Enron world, it is the rare corporation that will risk indictment ... let
alone a trial.... Knowing this, the government has virtually unfettered
discretion to exact a deferred prosecution agreement from a
corporation.... ""'
A DPA requires a defendant to meet certain conditions in return for a
prosecutor's promise to defer any prosecution-and ultimately to drop
charges -provided the conditions are met. 7 4 Because the authority to bring
charges or to offer a deal rests exclusively with the prosecutor, he has virtually
complete control over negotiating the terms of a DPA. And in the context of
DPAs offered to corporations, the terms imposed by prosecutors are very
telling: to "cooperate," corporations are generally required to take a series of
172. See Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shift, Corporate Deals Replace Trials, N.Y. TIES, Apr. 9, 2008,
at Ai.
173. Weissmann & Newman, supra note 4, at 414.
174. For an excellent overview of deferred prosecution agreements authored by two former
federal prosecutors, see Michael R. Sklaire & Joshua G. Berman, Deferred Prosecution
Agreements: What is the Cost of Staying in Business? LEGAL OPINION LETTER (Wash. Legal
Found., Washington D.C.), June 3, 2005, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/
o6o3o5LOLSklaire.pdf.
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steps aimed primarily at facilitating the investigation of those individual
employees accused of misconduct. 7 '
The terms and conditions prosecutors can, and indeed must, consider in
determining whether to offer a corporation a DPA were, until recently, set out
in the Thompson Memorandum, which more generally provided prosecutors
with a set of policies developed at the Department of Justice to guide the
investigation and prosecution of corporations.' 76 Noting that a prosecutor was
likely to encounter "obstacles" in pursuing individual defendants, including
difficulty "determin[ing] which individual took which action," the Thompson
Memo instructed prosecutors that "a corporation's cooperation may be critical
in identifying the culprits and locating relevant evidence.' ' 7
With that goal in mind -identifying and pursuing individual "culprits" -
the Thompson Memo therefore authorized prosecutors to require
"cooperating" corporations (1) to waive the corporation's attorney-client
privilege and then produce any and all documents and records prosecutors seek
in their investigation of individual employees; 178 (2) to provide assistance in
discovery by instigating an internal investigation of the misconduct,
interviewing potentially culpable individuals, and hand-delivering relevant
documents rather than forcing prosecutors to sift through the millions of
documents themselves ; 79 (3) to terminate indemnification of individual
employees under investigation, thereby forcing them to retain -and pay for -
175. See Kern Griffin, supra note 1, at 329 (noting the increased "partnering" of the government
via DPAs "coincides with a shift to retail prosecution of individuals" and concluding that
corporations were using individual employees as "currency to purchase corporate deferral
[agreements]").
176. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't
Components and U.S. Att'ys, (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business-organizations.pdf. The Thompson Memo was
revised in December 2006 and replaced by the McNulty Memo. See supra note 17.
177. Thompson Memo, supra note 176, at 6.
178. Id. ("In gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the prosecutor may consider
the corporation's willingness to identify the culprits within the corporation, including senior
executives; to make witnesses available; to disclose the complete results of its internal
investigation; and to waive attorney-client and work product protection."); see id. at 7 ("One
factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a corporation's cooperation is
the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and
work product protections .... Such waivers permit the government to obtain statements of
possible witnesses, subjects, and targets .... ").
179. See id. (noting that the DOJ "encourages corporations [seeking to cooperate] ... to conduct
internal investigations and to disclose their findings to the appropriate authorities").
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their own lawyers; 8° and (4) to cease any other assistance to individual
employees under investigation, by terminating them immediately, barring
them from accessing their own offices or records or from speaking with other
employees."'
Of course, each of the above conditions could be considered relevant to
evaluating the corporation's misconduct as an entity. But of more theoretical
importance and practical significance, each of the above conditions greatly
facilitates efforts to investigate individual employees, and a number of the
above conditions make it far more difficult for those individuals to defend
themselves from criminal prosecution. Waiver of the privilege, for example,
allows prosecutors to overcome one of the more critical evidentiary hurdles to
investigating individuals, and termination of indemnification often precludes
individual employees from retaining large legal defense teams that might
further hinder investigation and prosecution. Indeed, as the Thompson Memo
stated explicitly, "indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the
government to ... prevent, discover, and punish [individual] white collar
crime.,182
That criminal prosecution is meant to help prosecutors pursue individual
defendants -rather than to accurately address a corporation's criminal
culpability-is further evinced by the factors prosecutors do not need to
consider in determining whether or not to press charges against a company.
Under the directives of the Thompson Memo and its more recent
incarnations, 8 federal prosecutors need not give determinative weight to the
1so. Id. at 7-8 ("[A] corporation's promise of support to culpable employees and agents, ...
through the advancing of attorneys fees ... may be considered by the prosecutor in
weighing the extent and value of a corporation's cooperation.").
181. Id. at 7 ("Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation appears
to be protecting its culpable employees and agents.").
182. Id. at 1.
183. In response to considerable criticism, the Department of Justice has revised and largely
abandoned the Thompson Memo as Department practice. While the McNulty Memo,
which replaced the Thompson Memo, imposed some limits on when prosecutors could
make each of the demands highlighted in this discussion -notably, when prosecutors could
demand that a company waive its attorney-client privilege -it nonetheless reserved for
prosecutors the right to exercise such powers. See McNulty Memo, supra note 17, at 8-9.
Most recently, the Department, in response to congressional inquiry, has again revisited its
guidelines on seeking the waiver of the corporate privilege and suggested that, in response
to continuing criticism, it would no longer seek such waiver as a condition of granting a
DPA in the future. See Schmidt, supra note 17; see also Letter from Mark Filip, U.S. Deputy
Att'y Gen., to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on Judiciary, and Senator Arlen
Specter, Ranking Member, Comm. on Judiciary (July 9, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Letter],
available at http://www.acc.com/resource/v9892 (follow "View this document" hyperlink).
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level of the individual employees within the corporation, or the knowledge, if
any, that managers or directors had of those individuals' criminal conduct.
Moreover, while factors such as the existence of an internal compliance
program or the corporation's role in alerting authorities to the possibility of
wrongdoing may be considered, they are not controlling, and a prosecutor
remains free to charge - or threaten to charge - such corporations in pursuit of
more far-reaching cooperation.'8 4 The fact that prosecutors give little, if any
weight, to those factors is puzzling if one views corporate criminal liability as
an attempt to realistically assess a corporation's criminal wrongdoing. But it is
not surprising at all in light of this Note's thesis that such criminal liability is
less a reflection of principled criminal theory and more a tool of American
prosecutors.
Perhaps most significant, however, is the fact that corporations are offered
DPAs-and not traditional plea bargains-in the first place. Unlike plea
bargains, which generally involve a reduction in the charges brought or a
lighter sentence in return for a defendant's admission of guilt, a DPA is an
agreement to dismiss an indictment entirely (or never seek one in the first
place) in return for the defendant's cooperation."' Offering a corporation a
DPA, thus, is not merely offering leniency; it is a promise of absolution for any
criminal liability, or as one critical account derisively termed it, a "get-out-of-
jail-free card.' 8 6
2. The American Outcome and Its Surprising Similarity to the German
Outcome
Operating under the terms of the Thompson Memo and its more recent
successor, the McNulty Memo, federal prosecutors have had a great deal of
success obtaining cooperation agreements from corporations and using those
Such recent changes do nothing to undercut the core contention of this Note -to the
contrary, those changes, and the criticism that prompted them, strongly suggest the extent
to which corporate criminal liability was a powerful tool developed and held by prosecutors.
For a discussion of the McNulty Memo and some of the changes it ushered in, see, for
example, Keith Paul Bishop, The McNulty Memo -Continuing the Disappointment, 1O CHAP.
L. REV. 729 (2007).
184. See Thompson Memo, supra note 176, at 8 ("[T]he existence of a compliance program is not
sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation ...."); see also id. at 9 ("A
corporate compliance program, even one specifically prohibiting the very conduct in
question, does not absolve the corporation from criminal liability . ).
185. See Sklaire & Berman, supra note 174, at 1.
186. Lichtblau, supra note 172.
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agreements to pursue individual defendants. Consider just one recent and very
high-profile example - the accounting firm KPMG. When informed that it was
under investigation for tax fraud, KPMG quickly took significant steps in an
effort to obtain a deferred prosecution agreement. KPMG thus agreed to waive
the corporate privilege, to turn over the contents of its own internal
investigation, and most controversially, to cut off the advancement of
attorneys' fees to the individual partners under investigation, despite the fact
that KPMG's partnership agreement explicitly required indemnification under
the circumstances. 87 As a result, KPMG was given a DPA and, to date, has
never been charged with a crime. Prosecution of more than a dozen individual
employees is ongoing.'
88
KPMG is hardly alone. Merrill Lynch cooperated fully, facilitating the
prosecution of two bankers involved in the Enron scandal;19 AOL cooperated
fully, leading four former executives to plead guilty to securities fraud;190
Adelphia entered into a DPA, helping to facilitate the prosecution of founder
and former CEO John Rigas and his son, former CFO Timothy Rigas;' 9 '
WorldCom cooperated, leading to the successful prosecution of several former
executives including former CEO Bernie Ebbers;' 92 and so on.
187. Cf United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338-50, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (reviewing
KPMG's efforts to cooperate, and holding that its decision to cease indemnification in
response to pressure from federal prosecutors violated the individual defendants' Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights). The Stein opinion, authored by Southern District of New York
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, has been the subject of a great deal of commentary-much of it
laudatory as a matter of policy. Judge Kaplan's ruling was affirmed in its entirety by the
Second Circuit in the summer of 2008. See United States v. Stein, No. 07-3042-CR, 2008
WL 3982104 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2008).
188. As a result of Judge Kaplan's decision in Stein that federal prosecutors had violated the
constitutional rights of the individual defendants targeted, a number of those defendants
moved for a dismissal of the indictment against them. Judge Kaplan granted that dismissal
with regard to some, but not all of the defendants. See United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp.
2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). That decision was also affirmed by the Second Circuit. See Stein,
2008 WL 3982104.
i8g. Letter from Leslie R. Caldwell, Dir., Dep't of Justice Enron Task Force, to Robert Morvillo
and Charles Stillman, Counsel to Merrill, Lynch & Co. (Sept. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/merill2oo3.pdf.
19o. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. America Online, Cr. No. 1:o4 M 1133
(EDVA Dec. 15, 2004), available at http ://www.corporatecrimereporter.com
documents/aol.pdf.
191. Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Att'y for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Alan Vinegrad and Philip
C. Korologos, Att'ys for Adelphia Corp. (Apr. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/adelphia.pdf
192. By the time the agreement was reached, WorldCom had become MCI. Letter from David N.
Kelley, U.S. Att'y for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to Charles P. Scheeler, Att'y for MCI Corp. (Aug.
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As a result, in the five years since the Enron fraud was first disclosed, just
one corporation -Arthur Andersen-has been convicted of a crime at trial,
while some i1oo individuals-including more than 200 CEOs-have pled
guilty or been convicted of white-collar charges.' 93 Put differently, the result of
so many of the recent investigations into corporate crime has generally been
that the corporation itself is absolved of criminal liability. But the price it pays
for such absolution involves the waiver of many evidentiary protections and
assistance in the prosecution of individual employees.
With that general outcome in mind, perhaps surprisingly, the American
system begins to look remarkably similar to the German system: corporations
face no criminal liability - only individual employees do - but corporations also
have no real power to block prosecutions of those individuals by, for example,
invoking a wide-ranging attorney-client privilege to impede an investigation or
assisting an individual defendant in retaining a team of high-priced attorneys
to stave off indictment. Of course, in the United States, that result is achieved
only through a negotiated deal that would neither be possible nor necessary in
the German system. Put differently, the outcome mandated by German law is
achieved in the United States only through negotiation, through the leveraging
of prosecutorial powers on the one hand and defendants' rights and
protections on the other.
Perhaps not surprisingly, that process of leveraging and negotiating-
arguably more than the notion of corporate criminal liability itself-has
prompted a great deal of criticism and anger on the part of corporations and
their attorneys. 194 But it is also quite instructive when understanding the
explosion of the American doctrine. As one scholar noted, in the United States,
"[t]he mere threat of a criminal charge motivates firms to conduct in-house
investigations, cooperate fully with prosecutors, distance themselves from the
conduct of their agent, and jettison employees involved in the transaction."'' 95
Translated more directly into the context of this discussion, the threat of
corporate criminal liability prompts American corporations to forgo the unique
procedural protections the American system affords them and to start acting
much like a German corporation would be required to by German law under
30, 2005), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/
mcinonpros-ooo.pdf.
193. Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REv. 1, 3 (2008) (collecting data on these "staggering" numbers).
194. See, e.g., Diskant, supra note 2 (arguing that corporations "are at the mercy of prosecutors,
whose demands ... must largely be obeyed" and concluding that this "creates an unhealthy
imbalance in our system").
195. Moohr, supra note 3, at 175.
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similar circumstances. Additionally, as a result, the individual American
employees at the core of any criminal investigation are placed in a similar
position to their German counterparts -far less protected by the employers for
whom they work and far more vulnerable to individual investigation and
prosecution. And these realities-and what they mean for American
prosecutors, corporations, and white-collar defendants-when extrapolated in
a comparative context, are critical to understanding the development and
explosion of entity liability in this country.
CONCLUSION
Writing on American corporate criminal liability, Gerhard Mueller rather
famously noted, "nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It
just grew. ' '196 Mueller's quip, however clever, is neither unique in a field many
scholars and practitioners have decried as unprincipled and under-theorized," 7
nor, more important, is it entirely accurate. To the contrary, as this account
would have it, the doctrine's somewhat unseemly growth may have been
uncoordinated, but it was far from accidental, let alone inexplicable. American
prosecutors, aided by an American Congress, American courts, and most
important, an American system of criminal procedure, pushed, expanded, and
manipulated the doctrine in the process of pursuing both corporations and
individual employees to create the system we have today.
Indeed, the theoretical implications of this Note's central argument extend
most directly to those critics who throw up their hands, decrying the lack of a
centralized or theorized approach to the expansion of corporate criminal
liability in the United States. The answer, as this Note has argued, is that there
may be no overarching or logically satisfying theoretical explanation because
the doctrine has expanded not solely as a legislatively driven policy choice, but
instead, in significant part, as the result of individual, prosecutorial decisions in
the context of specific cases.'98
196. Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code
Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITr. L. REv. 21, 21 (1957).
197. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (summarizing similar critiques).
198. This, of course, is not wholly to reject the relevance of the varying theoretical explanations
addressed in Part I. Each such theory undoubtedly offers some insight into the distinctions
between the two systems. Differences in the theoretical view of the corporation, for example,
play some role, as do different approaches to regulating corporate behavior and punishing
criminal wrongdoing. Instead, the argument advanced here is meant to suggest that no
explanation can be complete if it does not take into account the critical role that American
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For theorists seeking to explain when, and under what circumstances,
American entity liability has expanded, the answers therefore are not likely to
lie in policy or criminal theory. Instead, those critics should perhaps pay
greater attention to when prosecutors would have felt the need to more
aggressively pursue white-collar crime. Indeed, as this Note's thesis would
have it, it is no mere coincidence that attempts to prosecute corporations first
flourished the in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, that they blossomed
anew in the mid-198os in response to the market scams of the early Reagan
Administration, and that they thrived in response to the rash of corporate fraud
in the wake of the Enron collapse. At each relevant period, American
prosecutors responded to waves of individual white-collar crime, and a critical
component of that response was the decision to pressure the corporations those
individuals worked for with the threat of entity liability.
Moreover, the fact that both the American and German systems ultimately
pursue the same goal-the prosecution of individual wrongdoers -suggests
that the account provided here may be more functionalist than initially
anticipated. After all, the two systems pursue similar ends through distinct
legal regimes developed in response to unique administrative and criminal
justice systems. Appreciating the work functionalism could do here, however,
requires a view of the "function" at stake as more than just the regulation of
corporate behavior. Rather, it is the regulation of corporate behavior and
individual white-collar criminals within the context of distinct criminal justice
systems that allocate powers and protections very differently.
Leaving theory aside for a moment, the real value of the comparative work
done here may be for practitioners and policymakers in the United States,
many of whom are currently focused on reforming the American doctrine. As
alluded to above, current American doctrine and prosecutorial practice have
come under significant criticism from business leaders, the defense bar, and
even politicians, all of whom generally decry the doctrine of corporate criminal
liability. 99 For such critics, the prevailing view of the doctrine as neither
anchored to criminal theory nor logically developed policy has been a useful
tool for attacking the current state of the law.2"'
By tying corporate criminal liability directly to the prosecution of
individual wrongdoers, the account offered here sharply weakens those
criticisms by placing the American doctrine in a broader context that both
criminal procedure has played in the development of the American doctrine of corporate
criminal liability.
199. See supra notes 1-4 (collecting examples of recent criticisms of the American doctrine levied
by practitioners).
2oo. See id.
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explains its origins and justifies its significance. As this account would have it,
if the doctrine of corporate criminal liability did not exist, American
prosecutors would have considerably more difficulty pursuing individual
wrongdoers, a goal even the most ardent critics of current practice would not
and, indeed, could not find objectionable.
Perhaps more important, should reform of the American system occur, this
Note provides a potential roadmap. Return, for a moment, to the conclusion
reached above -that the German and American systems both pursue relatively
similar ends, the jailing of individual wrongdoers rather than the corporations
they work for, through vastly different procedures. In particular, while such a
result is dictated by German law that would not permit charging a corporation
in the first place, it is bargained for in the American system. Not surprisingly, it
is within the context of that bargaining process that so many of the practices
currently under attack in the United States arise: the ability of corporations to
stymie investigations on the one hand, and the power of prosecutors to compel
cooperation on the other.
Reforming the American practice and curbing these abuses could be
achieved by borrowing from the German model, reducing the need for
bargaining, and instead dictating the desired outcome by law. For example,
Congress could curtail the corporate attorney-client privilege, giving
prosecutors much greater access to information necessary to prosecute
individuals, while at the same time eliminating large swaths of corporate
criminal liability. Congress could also take more incremental steps, restoring
the "control group" restriction on the scope of the corporate privilege, °1 while
at the same time limiting corporate criminal liability to those instances where
the underlying conduct was committed or approved of by a controlling
member of the corporation. 2 The result of such reforms would be a system
more in line with the German one, whereby corporations faced far less threat of
criminal liability but also possessed fewer powers to protect guilty
employees.203
2o. Prior to the Upjohn decision, see supra note 1O9, the "control group" test was law in the
United States. Applying it, a court would ask whether the person speaking with corporate
counsel was "in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about
any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney." City of Phila. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 21o F. Supp. 483,485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
202. With some exceptions, this is the position endorsed by the Model Penal Code. See MODEL
PENAL CODE 5 2.07(1)(c) (1985).
203. Congress could similarly alter corporate behavior by enacting a "selective waiver" statute
that preserved the corporate privilege in civil litigation even when corporations chose to
waive it to cooperate with a criminal investigation, or Congress could require corporations
to investigate and disclose any potential misconduct to federal prosecutors or make
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The crucial lesson the comparison to Germany offers, however, is that both
American prosecutors and American corporations possess powers and
privileges that their German counterparts do not possess-powers and
privileges that can be, and arguably are, currently being abused. Reforming the
American system, thus, while preserving the important and undisputed need to
prosecute individual wrongdoers, ought to focus on reining in not just
prosecutors, but corporations as well. Inherent in the very notion of
bargaining, and certainly present in the American system, are carrots and sticks
held by both sides. Curbing the powers of only one side might change that
process, but it would do so by skewing the outcome, rather than by fixing the
procedure by which the correct outcome was reached.
The above might seem like a rather straightforward, if not downright
obvious, conclusion to draw, yet it is one currently lost in virtually all
discussion of reforming the American system. Indeed, such discussion has
focused almost exclusively on containing the powers prosecutors possess, with
little or no attention paid to the corresponding rights and privileges
corporations maintain.2 °4 As just one blatant example of that phenomenon,
consider again the crucial recent KPMG investigation. As noted above, in the
wake of that investigation, critics assailed the allegedly abusive prosecutorial
practice of forcing corporations to forgo indemnification of individual
employees under investigation as a condition of obtaining a DPA" s Virtually
nothing, however, was made of the finding by a federal judge that KPMG had
grossly overasserted, even abused, the corporate attorney-client privilege in an
effort to stymie the investigation into those individual employees and the
clients for whom they worked." 6 As a result, the sole reforms to emerge from
the KPMG case were voluntary decisions by the Department of Justice to
change its practice with regard to indemnification and with regard to seeking
indemnification agreements illegal. For an interesting discussion of the potential for a
selective-waiver doctrine, see, for example, Michael H. Dore, A Matter of Fairness: The Need
for a New Look at Selective Waiver in SEC Investigations, 89 MARO. L. REV. 761 (2006); and
Andrew J. McNally, Comment, Revitalizing Selective Waiver: Encouraging Voluntary
Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing by Restricting Third Party Access to Disclosed Materials, 35
SETON HALLL. REv. 823 (2005).
204. See supra notes 194-195; see also supra note i8o (discussing recent, one-sided changes to the
Thompson Memo that curb prosecutors without similarly disarming corporations).
205. See supra note 183.
2o6. See United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 48 (D.D.C. 2002) (Hogan, C.J.)
(finding, after the government challenged KPMG's wide-reaching assertion of the corporate
attorney-client privilege in response to a government subpoena, that less than fifteen
percent of the documents for which the privilege was claimed were actually entided to the
protection of the privilege).
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waiver of the corporate privilege.2 °7 In other words, the corporation's defense
mechanisms like the privilege not only remained intact, but were given
208additional protection.
Similarly, almost all of the proposed congressional reforms of the American
doctrine have focused on limiting prosecutors - and prosecutors alone - from
exercising many of the powers discussed above in the context of investigating
and prosecuting corporate crime. For example, one prominent recent bill, the
"Attorney Client Privilege Act of 2007," was aimed at protecting the corporate
attorney-client privilege and would have precluded prosecutors from
pressuring corporations to waive the privilege or even considering the issue of
waiver in making charging decisions. 0 9 Corporations would not have been
disarmed in any comparable manner.
It is well beyond the scope of this Note to advocate for specific reform
proposals or even to argue conclusively that reform of the American system is
necessary. The goal, instead, is to advance a new way of thinking about the
American doctrine, one grounded in a comparative approach that should be of
use to policymakers, should they decide reform is prudent. And, for theorists
and scholars who have long ignored the topic, the argument presented here is
an invitation to revisit corporate criminal liability and its practical and
theoretical significance through the prism of comparative law.
207. See supra note 17.
208. If anything, the corporate attorney-client privilege was actually strengthened in the wake of
the KPMG affair. The same McNulty Memorandum that modified Department of Justice
guidelines on indemnification also significantly restricted federal prosecutors seeking waiver
of the corporate privilege, requiring that any such request for a waiver be approved by Main
Justice. See McNulty Memo, supra note 17, at 9-1o. Most recently, the Department has
suggested it will be even more hesitant to seek waiver of the privilege, restricting both the
circumstances under which such a waiver will be sought and the nature of the information
to be obtained should waiver be appropriate. See Filip Letter, supra note 183.
209. See S. 186, 1ioth Cong. (2007). The Senate never voted on this bill, though the House
passed an identical version. See Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Justice and Corporate
Prosecutions: The Coming Saga, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 20o8, at 3.
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